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THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY 
MARK D. ROSEN*
ABSTRACT
Democracy does not spontaneously occur by citizens gathering to
choose laws. Instead, representative democracy takes place within an
extensive legal framework that determines such matters as who gets
to vote, how campaigns are conducted, and what conditions must be
met for representatives to make valid law. Many of the “rules of the
road” that operationalize republicanism have been subject to consti-
tutional challenges in recent decades. For example, lawsuits have
been brought against partisan gerrymandering—which is partly
responsible for the fact that most congressional districts are no longer
party competitive, but instead are either safely Republican or safely
Democratic—and against onerous voter identification requirements
that reduce the voting rates of certain voting populations.
These challenges were based on individual rights claims grounded
in equal protection or free speech. This Article’s claim is that the
rules of the road also implicate a structural constitutional principle,
wholly independent of individual rights-based claims, that to date
has gone unnoticed: what I call “Republican Legitimacy.” This
Article explains Republican Legitimacy’s source and content, and the
costs of failing to recognize it.
Republican Legitimacy’s absence has distorted judicial analyses
and led to egregious conduct by members of the state and federal
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University of Illinois at Chicago, and a symposium on Constitutional Law and Democracy at
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helpful comments. I dedicate this Article to my lovely daughter, Tila, who recently pointed
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legislatures. As to courts, individual rights doctrines have been
unable to protect the structural principle of Republican Legitimacy.
Republican Legitimacy identifies legally significant facts that are
overlooked by rights doctrines that focus primarily on individuals,
provides conceptual traction that rights-based doctrines do not, and
makes clear why various subdoctrines developed in the individual
rights context that limit judicial review have no rightful application
with respect to a structural principle like Republican Legitimacy. For
these reasons, rights-based doctrines cannot protect the structural
principle of Republican Legitimacy.
As to legislatures, Republican Legitimacy’s absence has led
members of the legislative and executive branches to think that
democracy’s rules of the road are a part of ordinary politics.
Republican Legitimacy makes clear that politicians have a special
duty to act with a higher order of care when choosing democracy’s
rules of the road: they must act in accordance with “tempered” rather
than “hardball” politics. As skeptical as one may be of politicians,
there is no reason to assume legislators would not take seriously their
oaths to uphold the Constitution once they understood it included
Republican Legitimacy. Furthermore, there are steps that courts and
Congress can take to encourage state legislatures—the institutions
presumptively responsible for most of the rules of the road under the
Constitution—to act consistently with tempered politics.
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“We are in the business of rigging elections.”
Vieth v. Jubelirer (quoting a North Carolina State Senator)1
“We are going to shove [the district map] up your f**king ass and
you are going to like it, and I’ll f**k any Republican I can.” 
Democratic chairman regarding the new districting plan for
Democratic-led county board in Illinois2
“[W]e are going to draw the lines so that Republicans will be in
oblivion in the state of New York for the next 20 years.” 
Malcolm Smith, New York State Senate president3
“It is fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a
significant role in the decision to enact [Indiana’s voter identifica-
tion law].”
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board4
“Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or what they
believe, but how it will affect fundraising. Who, after all, can
seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way
one thinks about—and quite possibly votes on—an issue?”
Alan Simpson, former United States Senator5
“Even a cursory survey of world events over the last 20—or 100—
years makes plain that democracies are fragile, that democratic
institutions can be undermined from within. Ours are no exception.”
Alexander Keyssar6
1. 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting John Hoeffel, Six
Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2. JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING 1 (2008).
3. Editorial, He Probably Didn’t Mean To, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A32.
4. 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
5. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (quoting declaration of former U.S. Senator
Alan Simpson) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Alexander Keyssar, The Strange Career of Voter Suppression, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2012, at A23.
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INTRODUCTION
Representative democracy does not spontaneously occur by
citizens gathering to choose laws. Instead, republicanism takes
place within an extensive legal framework that determines such
matters as who gets to vote, how campaigns are conducted, and
what conditions must be met for representatives to make valid law.
Many of these “rules of the road” that operationalize representative
democracy have been subject to constitutional challenges in recent
decades. For example, lawsuits have been brought against “partisan
gerrymandering”—which has contributed to most congressional
districts not being party competitive, but instead being safely
Republican or Democratic7—and against onerous voter identification
requirements that reduce the voting rates of certain voting popula-
tions.8
These constitutional challenges were based on individual rights
claims that were grounded in equal protection or free speech.9 This
Article’s core argument is that the rules of the road of represen-
tative democracy also implicate a structural constitutional princi-
ple, wholly independent of individual rights-based claims, that to
date has gone unnoticed: what I call the principle of “Republican
Legitimacy.”10 This Article explains Republican Legitimacy’s source
7. See Vieth v. Jubiler, 541 U.S. 267, 271 (2004); see also Sam Hirsch, The United States
House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional
Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2003) (providing exhaustive analysis of gerrymandering
of congressional districts); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The
Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649,
663-64 (2002) (noting that most congressional districts are safely Democratic or Republican).
But see Rhodes Cook, Congressional Redistricting: Is Creating “Safe” Districts a Dying Art?,
SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
frc2011033101 (“[S]afe congressional seats will always be with us, but probably not as many
as their most ambitious creators would want.”).
8. See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185-87.
9. See, e.g., id. at 187; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272, 294.
10. I have learned greatly from the approaches other scholars have taken. Perhaps the
closest approach to mine is that of Professor Teachout, who has proposed that the
Constitution contains an “anti-corruption” principle. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-
Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). However, as explained in Parts I and
II, there are significant differences between anti-corruption and Republican Legitimacy. 
Professor Pildes has astutely written about “the constitutional violation ... in the structural
harm to representative self-government that results when state legislatures abuse their
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and content, the costs of failing to recognize it, and the payoffs of
doing so. 
Republican Legitimacy’s derivation is relatively straightforward.
The Constitution establishes a federal government that essentially
is a representative democracy—that is, a republican form of gov-
ernment. The Constitution also guarantees a republican form of
government to the states. The Constitution’s establishment and
guarantee of republicanism across the federal and state govern-
ments encompass the necessary preconditions for these republican
forms of government to successfully and legitimately operate. These
preconditions are the contents of the constitutional principle of
Republican Legitimacy. 
Republican Legitimacy’s absence has led to egregious conduct by
legislatures and distorted judicial analyses. As to legislatures, look
again at the shocking statements collected in the prologue11:
legislators acknowledging that they “are in the business of rigging
elections,”12 that “we are going to draw the lines so that Republicans
will be in oblivion in the state of New York for the next 20 years,”13
and that campaign “donation[s] ... alter the way one thinks about
—and quite possibly votes on—an issue.”14 The harm is not just to
individuals, but to republican government itself. 
More generally, inattentiveness to Republican Legitimacy has led
legislators to think that democracy’s rules of the road are a part of
ordinary politics. Republican Legitimacy makes clear that politi-
cians have a special duty to act with a higher order of care when
choosing the rules of the road: they must act in accordance with
powers under the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, and deliberately suppress competitive
elections in systematic fashion.” Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political
Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 255 (2006). This Article builds on the insights of Pildes and
others concerning structural constitutional harms, but the principle it identifies—Republican
Legitimacy—derives from elsewhere and is significantly broader. See infra Part II.C.2.
Republican Legitimacy applies not only to the districting wrongs Pildes discusses but to all
rules of the road that operationalize representative democracy.
11. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
12. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting John Hoeffel, Six
Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See He Probably Didn’t Mean To, supra note 3.
14. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (quoting declaration of former U.S. Senator
Alan Simpson).
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“tempered” rather than “hardball” politics.15 As skeptical as one may
be of politicians, there is no reason to assume legislators would not
take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution once they
understand it includes Republican Legitimacy. Moreover, the courts
and Congress can take steps to encourage state legislatures—the
institutions presumptively responsible for most of the rules of the
road under the Constitution16—to act consistently with “tempered
politics.”17
As to courts, the individual rights doctrines they have invoked
have left the structural interests of Republican Legitimacy vulnera-
ble. Republican Legitimacy identifies legally significant facts that
are overlooked by rights doctrines that focus primarily on individu-
als, provides conceptual traction that rights-based doctrines do not,
and makes clear why various subdoctrines developed in the indi-
vidual rights context that limit judicial review have no rightful
application with respect to a structural principle like Republican
Legitimacy.18
This Article’s argument unfolds in four parts. Part I explains the
doctrinal source of Republican Legitimacy, as well as its contents.
Like the constitutional principles of separation of powers and fed-
eralism, Republican Legitimacy is a structural principle that pro-
tects and effectuates the republican institutions that are created
and guaranteed by the Constitution.19 Republican Legitimacy se-
cures the necessary conditions in order for decisions of the people’s
representatives to legitimately bind the people. Drawing primarily
on political theory, Part I explains that Republican Legitimacy has
two components: (1) the mechanisms for determining who will be
the representatives in a republican form of government (Legitimate-
Selection) and (2) the decision-making processes that the represen-
tatives use in generating the laws that are to bind the polity
(Legitimate-Decisionmaking).20 Part I then anticipates several pos-
sible objections and explains why Republican Legitimacy is con-
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
17. See Mark D. Rosen, Implementing Republican Legitimacy: Courts and Tempered
Politics (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
18. See infra Part II.C.2.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B.
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ceptually and doctrinally superior to the “anti-corruption” principle
that is both found in some case law and discussed by several
scholars.21
Part II then considers to what extent Republican Legitimacy is
already present in the Court’s jurisprudence. It first shows that
many Supreme Court decisions have recognized the significance of
the two components of Republican Legitimacy.22 Most of these deci-
sions, however, have folded these aspects of Republican Legitimacy
into the individual rights doctrines of equal protection and free
speech.23 Part II explains why it is critical that Republican Legiti-
macy be recognized as a structural constitutional principle that is
independent of the individual rights doctrines of equal protection
and free speech. 
Part III demonstrates Republican Legitimacy’s explanatory power
by applying it to three recent Supreme Court decisions. Republican
Legitimacy illuminates troublesome features of Indiana’s strict
voter identification law that were not treated as legally significant
under Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, and explains why a successful challenge
would not require a showing of discriminatory intent, pace Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion.24 Part III then uses Republican
Legitimacy to critique the Vieth v. Jubelirer decision,25 which vir-
tually declared partisan gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable.26
Republican Legitimacy identifies heretofore unrecognized common
ground shared by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the four Vieth
dissenters that conceivably could have led to a different result in the
case.27
21. See supra note 10; infra Part I.C.
22. See infra Part II.A-B.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. 553 U.S. 181, 190 & n.8 (2008) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See Vieth v. Jubiler, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, which provided the crucial fifth vote, left only a small window open
for partisan gerrymandering claims. See id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The door was
kept open in the last Supreme Court case that addressed partisan gerrymandering, League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), in which the Court’s two
newest members reserved the question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims can be
justiciable. See id. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
27. See infra Part III.B.
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Part III then applies Republican Legitimacy to the Court’s
divisive decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
which invoked the First Amendment to strike down the provision of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that prohibited the
use of corporate and union general treasury funds for independent
expenditures.28 Republican Legitimacy clarifies the nature and
significance of the governmental interest behind the Act’s expendi-
tures prohibition.29 Republican Legitimacy provides a more elegant
and compelling frame for understanding the welter of policies
discussed in Justice Stevens’s dissent under the rubrics of “anti-
corruption” and “anti-distortion,”30 and Republican Legitimacy’s
constitutional status explains why these policies satisfy the com-
pelling governmental interest requirement.31 Independent of this,
Part III also shows that deciding whether corporate and union
expenditures should be banned implicates a conflict between
competing constitutional principles—free speech and Republican
Legitimacy—and argues that Congress’s considered resolution of
such a constitutional conflict should have been entitled to substan-
tial deference by the Court.32
Part IV provides a conclusion that also serves as a prologue to a
companion article that considers what roles different governmental
and societal institutions must play if Republican Legitimacy is to be
appropriately guarded.33 While this Article begins to examine the
role that courts must play, a companion article explains that the
more political branches—the legislatures and executives at both the
federal and state levels—are primarily responsible for fully imple-
menting Republican Legitimacy.34 This conclusion builds on Larry
Sager’s brilliant demonstration that courts frequently underenforce
constitutional commitments and his concomitant argument that
complete realization of constitutional commitments accordingly
requires action by legislatures.35 While Sager focused attention on
28. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. See infra Part III.C.1.
32. See infra Part III.C.2.
33. See Rosen, supra note 17.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
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Congress’s role in complementing judicial underenforcement of
constitutional rights, Congress similarly plays an essential role in
fully structural constitutional principles as well.36 In short, Republi-
can Legitimacy is yet another structural constitutional principle
whose full realization requires the participation of the political
branches.
I. TEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL DERIVATION OF REPUBLICAN   
LEGITIMACY
This Part explains the derivation and contents of Republican
Legitimacy. It proceeds in three steps. Part I.A explains Republican
Legitimacy’s constitutional origins. Part I.B explains Republican
Legitimacy’s contents. Part I.C anticipates and responds to three
arguments that may be leveled against the claim that Republican
Legitimacy is an independent structural constitutional principle. 
A. Republican Legitimacy’s Doctrinal Derivation 
Republican Legitimacy is a structural constitutional principle
that derives from five constitutional provisions that together
establish that the federal and state governments are essentially
republican in character insofar as governmental power is exercised
by representatives who are ultimately answerable to citizens.37 The
first provision is Article I’s charge that the House of Representatives
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
36. See Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in Determining What Full Faith and
Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 7, 8-9, 12-28 (2010)
(explaining why courts inevitably either underenforce or overenforce the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, and arguing that Congress is better situated to properly calibrate the requirements
of full faith and credit).
37. To be sure, many different concepts of “republican” can be located among Americans
during the Founding Era. See AKHIL REED AMAR,AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:A BIOGRAPHY 276-
81 (2005) (demonstrating that many in the Framers’ generation treated democracy and
republicanism interchangeably); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 48-90, 593-615 (1969) (describing the evolution of the meaning of
“republicanism” between the Revolution and 1787). I draw upon Madison’s understanding of
republicanism in Federalist No. 10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81-84 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This has become the accepted definition today. See AMAR, supra,
at 276. 
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“shall be composed of Members chosen ... by the People.”38 The
second is the Seventeenth Amendment’s instruction that the Senate
be composed of Senators “elected by the people.”39 The third are the
constitutional provisions, as supplemented by custom, that establish
that the President is essentially popularly elected.40 Fourth, the
republican character of all these popularly elected institutions is
confirmed, and has been deepened, by the Amendments that have
expanded the franchise, namely the Fifteenth (race, color, or prev-
ious condition of servitude), Nineteenth (women), Twenty-fourth
(proscribing poll taxes), and Twenty-sixth (age).41 Fifth, and finally,
the Guarantee Clause provides that “[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.”42
Republican Legitimacy’s derivation from the above provisions is
straightforward: the Constitution’s establishment and guarantee of
republican forms of government include the minimum powers and
limitations that are necessary to protect and effectuate these repub-
lican institutions. These powers and limitations are themselves of
constitutional dimension, and they constitute the independent
structural constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy.43
The Supreme Court has recognized other nonexplicit structural
constitutional principles on the ground that they are necessary to
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
39. Id. amend. XVII.
40. Although Article II only provides that the President shall be elected by “Electors”
appointed by the state legislatures, id. art. II, § 1, it long has been understood that the federal
government is a “government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head
and legislative body are both elective.” Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884). The
Twenty-Third Amendment strengthens the President’s republican character by guaranteeing
that the people residing in the District of Columbia can participate in his election. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIII.
41. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
42. Id. art. IV, § 4. My claim that the Guarantee Clause is the source of a constitutional
principle binding states and the federal government is unaffected by the Clause’s being held
to be a nonjusticiable political question, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-20 (1962),
because nonjusticiable constitutional questions are still binding, even if they are not judicially
enforceable, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004). Further, the Court has held that
the Guarantee Clause is enforceable by Congress, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 220, and my proposal
places primary responsibility for enforcing Republican Legitimacy with Congress, see Rosen,
supra note 17. 
43. Jack Balkin has similarly spoken of “democratic self government” as a structural
principle. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
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preserve or effectuate institutions created by, or recognized by, the
Constitution. Most of these structural principles function as
limitations on expressly granted constitutional powers, but some
principles have been the source of affirmative governmental powers. 
The two best-known structural principles that operate as consti-
tutional limitations are separation of powers and federalism. In
Morrison v. Olson, for example, the Court held that Congress can
restrict the President’s power to remove executive officials only
insofar as it “does not interfere with the President’s exercise of the
‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”44 What was necessary to
preserve the President’s explicitly created constitutional powers
thus constituted an implied constitutional limitation on Congress’s
powers. Similarly, the Court in New York v. United States held that
Congress could not “commandeer” state legislatures, notwith-
standing the absence of an express constitutional provision barring
Congress from doing so, because such an anticommandeering rule
was necessary to “protect the sovereignty of States.”45 Republican
Legitimacy is similarly derived; it is a constitutional principle that
consists of what is necessary to preserve the representative de-
mocracy that our Constitution creates vis-à-vis the federal govern-
ment and guarantees vis-à-vis the states. 
Separation of powers and federalism are not the only examples of
implied constitutional limitations that protect constitutionally
created institutions. Consider the case of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, in which the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas
law establishing term limits for congressmen from that state.46 No
provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids states from imposing
44. 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II); see also id. at 693-96
(holding that the Ethics in Government Act “taken as a whole” does not “violate[ ] the
principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive
Branch”).
45. 505 U.S. 144, 161, 181, 188 (1992); see also id. at 177 (“In determining whether the
Tenth Amendment limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to generally
applicable laws, the Court has in some cases stated that it will evaluate the strength of
federal interests in light of the degree to which such laws would prevent the State from
functioning as a sovereign; that is, the extent to which such generally applicable laws would
impede a state government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to the citizens of
the State.”).
46. 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995).
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term limits. The Court nonetheless found an implied constitu-
tional limitation, justifying it, inter alia, on the ground that it was
necessary to protect the constitutionally created institution of the
House of Representatives: “The Constitution thus creates a uni-
form national body representing the interests of a single people.
Permitting individual States to formulate diverse qualifications for
their representatives would result in a patchwork of state qualifica-
tions, undermining the uniformity and the national character that
the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure.”47
The Court also has found implied constitutional powers on the
ground that they were necessary to effectuate constitutionally
created institutions. Consider first the executive privilege. The
Court held in United States v. Nixon that “[n]owhere in the Consti-
tution ... is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidential-
ity, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge
of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.”48 The Court’s
conclusion that the executive privilege is a constitutional power
rested on pragmatic reasoning: “The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of Government” because “[a] President and those who
assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately.”49 There must be
“candid, objective and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decisionmaking.”50
The Court also has found that Congress has implied constitu-
tional powers. Although the Constitution does not expressly grant
Congress the power to investigate, the Court held in McGrain v.
Daugherty that Congress has constitutional investigative powers
because such powers are a prerequisite to effective legislation.51
Congress “possess[es] not only such powers as are expressly granted
to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are
necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective.”52
In determining what “auxiliary” powers were necessary to “make
47. Id. at 822.
48. 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
49. Id. at 708. 
50. Id.
51. 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927).
52. Id. at 173.
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the express powers effective,” the Court once again utilized prag-
matic reasoning: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite informa-
tion—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere
requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain
what is needed.53
In short, separation of powers and federalism jurisprudence, as
well as the Thornton, Nixon, and McGrain decisions, all reasoned
that powers and limitations that were necessary to protect or
effectuate expressly created or recognized constitutional institutions
were themselves of constitutional status. Republican Legitimacy can
be derived on the same basis—the Constitution expressly estab-
lishes a republican federal government and guarantees that the
states similarly will have republican governments, and these consti-
tutional institutions and guarantees include the minimum condi-
tions that are necessary to protect and effectuate these republican
forms of government. 
* * * 
That the Court has found implied constitutional powers, and
limits, in other contexts does not, on its own, mean that it should do
so here. The Article’s next Parts explain why Republican Legitimacy
is another appropriate constitutional inference. Part I.B draws on
political theory to explain why there must be a principle such as
53. Id. at 175. The Court also noted that congressional investigative powers had a long
historical pedigree. See id. But the Court used the longstanding historical practice as
confirmation of the legislature’s pragmatic need of such a power, not as a prerequisite to
finding the constitutional power. See id. (“All this was true before and when the Constitution
was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry—with enforcing process—was
regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate—
indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that
the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are
intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.”). 
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Republican Legitimacy if republican institutions are to be well
functioning and stable. This analysis permits the construction of a
framework that fleshes out Republican Legitimacy’s concrete
contents. Parts II.A and II.B show that many of the components of
Republican Legitimacy already have been recognized in case law. 
Parts I.B and II.A-B are mutually reinforcing. Parts II.A-B
provide a doctrinal basis for Part I.B’s theoretical discussion.
Further, Part II serves as inductive support for Part I.B’s theoretical
reasoning.54 In the other direction, Part I.B’s analytical framework
offers critical insights into the Court’s jurisprudence. It makes clear
that case law that until now has been thought to address disparate
subjects, such as limitations on the franchise, term limits, and
campaign finance, actually is part of a single whole: the jurispru-
dence of Republican Legitimacy. 
Part I.B’s framework also identifies two shortcomings in the case
law. First, some matters that the Court has treated as “compelling
interests” are actually part of Republican Legitimacy and hence are
of independent constitutional status. Second, some matters that the
Court has treated under the rubric of individual rights are instead
aspects of the structural constitutional principle of Republican
Legitimacy. Part II.C explains why it is important that Republican
Legitimacy be understood as an independent constitutional prin-
ciple that is structural rather than rights-based. 
B. Republican Legitimacy’s Contents 
The contents of Republican Legitimacy are best identified by
asking the following question: what conditions must be met for
decisions of the people’s representatives to legitimately bind the
people? When political philosophers speak of legitimacy, they refer
to the government’s moral right to exercise political power.55
“[L]egitimacy is a weaker notion than justice,”56 meaning that
“[p]olitical power may be legitimately exercised in ways that are
unjust, unfair, or otherwise unjustifiable.”57 While a government’s
54. See infra note 242.
55. See, e.g., Simon CĆbulea May, Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of
Legitimacy, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 136, 137-38 (2009). 
56. Id. at 148.
57. Simon CĆbulea May, Democratic Legitimacy, Legal Expressivism, and Religious
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failure to operate justly is deeply unfortunate, a governmental
system’s inability to satisfy the demands of legitimacy is more
deeply destabilizing. In fact, it would seem that a governmental
system that cannot provide adequate answers as to why the powers
it exercises are legitimate cannot be both free and stable over time.
Jeremy Waldron expertly sets up the issue of legitimacy:
We imagine a decision being made by a certain process and we
imagine a citizen Cn—who is to be bound or burdened by the
decision—disagreeing with the decision and asking why she
should accept, comply, or put up with it. Some of those who
support the decision may try to persuade Cnthat it is right in its
substance. But they may fail, not because of any obtuseness on
her part, but simply because Cn continues (not unreasonably) to
hold a different view on this vexed and serious matter. What
then is to be said to Cn? A plausible answer may be offered to her
concerning the process by which the decision was reached. Even
though she disagrees with the outcome, she may be able to
accept that it was arrived at fairly. The theory of such a process-
based response is the theory of political legitimacy.58
Waldron concludes that there are two components to a theory of
political legitimacy. First, there must be an appropriate mechanism
for selecting which individuals will make the community’s political
decisions, such as who will be the representatives in a republican
form of government.59 I shall call this the “Legitimate-Selection”
component. Second, the representatives must themselves utilize an
acceptable decision-making procedure when creating laws.60 I call
this component “Legitimate-Decisionmaking.” In short, Legitimate-
Selection addresses the integrity of electoral results, whereas
Legitimate-Decisionmaking concerns legislative results.61
Establishment, 15 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 219, 220 (2012). 
58. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1387 (2006).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Sanford Levinson uses a similar two-part framework. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 27 (2006). 
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1. Legitimate-Selection
The constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy comprises
the minimum requirements of the two aforementioned components.
The Legitimate-Selection component encompasses what Waldron
helpfully calls “the theory of fair elections to the legislature,
elections in which people like Cnwere treated equally along with all
their fellow citizens in determining who should be privileged to be
among the small number participating” in the law making that will
bind Cnand all other citizens.62 Pace Waldron’s formulation, though,
there is not a single “theory of fair elections,” but instead multiple
legitimate contenders. For example, there are strong arguments on
behalf of both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.63
Reasonably controversial aspects of fair elections are not part of
the constitutional requirement of Republican Legitimacy, although
they may well be included in Waldron’s first component of political
democracy. Instead, Republican Legitimacy comprises matters
about which there can be no reasonable disagreement—matters that
are veritable sine qua nons of a republican system, such as the
requirement of competitive elections for important governmental
officials. For example, a political system where citizens vote only for
or against a single candidate for their country’s chief executive—as
in the former Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—categori-
cally falls outside the scope of a republican form of government.
Encompassed within Legitimate-Selection are such matters as who
has the franchise; how votes are cast, which in turn includes voter
registration and the mechanics of voting; and how votes are
aggregated, which includes such things as whether districts are
used and, if so, how they are drawn. I will have much more to say
about Legitimate-Selection in Part III. 
2. Legitimate-Decisionmaking
The contents of the second component of Republican Legitimacy, 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking, are difficult to specify. For example,
62. Waldron, supra note 58, at 1387.
63. For a useful discussion, see Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral
System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 3 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1984). 
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although majority rule might be considered to be a part of the
second component, there are strong reasons to resist this con-
clusion.64 Probably the most important aspect of Legitimate-
Decisionmaking derives from the fact that virtually all theories of
democracy incorporate a requirement that, when government acts,
it act for the purpose of promoting the “public good, somehow
defined” and, conversely, that “self-interested behavior by govern-
ment officials” is illegitimate.65
Indeed, “public good” requirements are a central component of the
theories of many of the most important political theorists, past and
present. A central concern of Western political theory is to explain
why the state can justifiably compel individuals against their will,
and the limits of that power.66 Public good requirements have played
a central role in answering these crucial questions.67
64. Waldron provides a brief but spirited defense of the principle of majority decision, but
his claim that majority decisionmaking is necessary to political legitimacy is doubtful. See
Waldron, supra note 58, at 1388. Majority rule, in fact, is normatively controversial. See
AMARTYA K.SEN,COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 161-63 (1970); ADRIAN VERMEULE,
MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 7 (2007); John O. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2007). Further, some aspects of the Constitution, such as the Treaty
Clause, explicitly demand a supermajority, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and it has been
persuasively argued that our Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements
effectively operate as a supermajority requirement, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra, at
1116.
65. See also VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 34 (“Disagreement about the uniquely best
definition of impartiality need not prove an embarrassment to the limited ambitions of real-
world democratic design, which are fully satisfied by identifying a set of decisions that all
competing definitions of impartiality condemn.”); cf. id. at 4-5. For example, Simon May
interestingly argues that self-interested legislation is illegitimate because it violates the
“principle of equal respect [which] states that government may only exercise political power
in ways that treat citizens as equals.” May, supra note 57, at 219; see also id. at 222 (using
the principle to explain why legislators “have no moral right” to enact laws that increase the
value of only their own property).
66. See, e.g., GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD 2 (2011) (“The question that has occupied
liberal political theory—whether free and equal persons can all endorse a common political
order even though their private judgments about the good and justice are so often opposed—is
the fundamental problem of a free moral order.”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 59
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859) (discussing “the nature and limits
of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” which for Mill
includes both state power and nonlegal customs); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217
(1993) (“[W]e ask: when may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political
power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake?”).
67. Indeed, public good requirements can be traced back to Aristotle and Aquinas. See
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According to John Locke, for example, the legislature has power
to enact laws only because “the public has chosen and appointed”
the legislature.68 This consent is the sine qua non of law’s legitimacy
for Locke: what is “absolutely necessary to ... a law” is that the law
has emanated from a body that has “the consent of the society; over
whom nobody can have a power to make laws, but by their own
consent, and by authority received from them.”69 Legislative power,
accordingly, can only extend to the powers granted by the people to
the legislature. And this principle determines the outer limit of
legislative power; because “nobody can transfer to another more
power than he has in himself,” the legislature can have no more
power than “those persons had in a state of nature before they
entered into society, and gave up to the community.”70 Locke under-
stands man’s powers under the law of nature to extend only to “the
preservation of himself and the rest of mankind,” and so Locke
accordingly concludes that the legislature’s “power, in the utmost
bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society,” which he
defines as the preservation of himself and mankind.71 Locke
consistently contrasts pursuit of the “public good” with the illegiti-
mate exercise of “power for [a ruler’s] private ends of their own”72
and with a ruler’s “distinct and separate interest from the good of
the community.”73
Public good requirements are also central to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Rousseau thought the state’s legitimate powers extend
only to “authentic act[s] of the general will,” meaning “the common
good” or “the common interest.”74 For Rousseau, the “general will”
Eduardo M. Penalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 305, 325 n.81 (2012). 
68. JOHN LOCKE,TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTERCONCERNING TOLERATION
158 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 159.
71. Id. (emphasis added). Locke also argues that the executive’s “prerogative” power gives
him the power to “act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of
the law, and sometimes even against it.” Id. at 172. But the executive’s prerogative power,
like the legislature’s power, is limited to that which is “for the public good.” Id.; see also id.
at 173.
72. Id. at 172. 
73. Id. at 173.
74. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 75-77 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
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consists only of those desires of an individual that are shared by all
other citizens in his polity.75 For this reason, when the state
identifies and enforces the general will, it does not compel a citizen
against his will. To the contrary, limiting state power to the general
will assures that the citizen need “obey nobody but [his] own will.”76
It follows that when lawmakers legislate, they must aim to advance
only the common good, and that they cannot act parochially
“towards any particular and circumscribed object.”77 This is yet
another public good requirement.
Although contemporary political theorists largely reject Locke’s
assumption of actual consent78 and Rousseau’s assumption that
laws constitute the overlap of citizens’ wills,79 most theorists
continue to embrace public good requirements.80 John Rawls,
for example, states that “[o]ur exercise of political power is
proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would
offer for our political actions—were we to state them as gov-
ernment officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think
that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.”81
He dubs this the “criterion of reciprocity” and concludes that
such reciprocity is  a requirement of “political legitimacy.”82
Furthermore, in apparent contradistinction to the stricter notion
of Rawlsian “public reason,” the criterion of reciprocity applies
to “particular statutes and laws enacted.”83 Self-interested “naked
75. See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY 103 (2008) (explaining Rousseau’s
“general will” as being “whatever is common to the will of all citizens”).
76. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 74, at 77. 
77. Id. at 75.
78. For example, though Rawls falls within the contractarian tradition, his approach does
not rest on citizens’ actual consent but instead aims to describe by means of the original
position what political structure reasonable persons hypothetically would consent to. See
generally Cynthia A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and Justification, 97 J. PHIL. 313, 313 & n.1
(2000). For the unusual example of a modern theorist who retains the requirement of actual
consent, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 11-31 (2004).
79. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 115-16 (1999).
80. Notable exceptions are the public choice theorists, who posit that politics is a forum,
no different from the marketplace, where people aim to advance their individual interests. I
discuss these theorists below. See infra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
81. See RAWLS, supra note 66, at 137.
82. Id.; see also id. at 149 (writing of “the idea of legitimacy and public reason’s role in
determining legitimate law”). 
83. Id. at 137. Public reason, by contrast, only applies to “fundamental political ques-
tions,” which Rawls tells us comprises “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”
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preferences”84 cannot satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, which
accordingly operates as a public good requirement.85
A public good requirement also features in the powerful work of
Brown University philosopher David Estlund. Estlund aims to
explain the legitimacy of democratic decision-making processes
without relying on citizens’ consent, because most citizens have not
given their actual consent to those processes or to the authority of
the government.86 His answer is that it is not sufficient that the
democratic procedure be “fair,” for if that were sufficient, then we
should be willing to “flip a coin” to make political decisions insofar
as coin flipping is perfectly random and hence fair—something that
no one is willing to do.87 Estlund concludes that, beyond being fair,
democratic procedures must have “some epistemic value;” that is to
say, they must have “a tendency to make correct decisions.”88
Estlund generates an illuminating, involved argument that
people would be morally obligated to consent to a democratic pro-
cedure with these characteristics, and that actual consent accord-
ingly is unnecessary just as moral obligations are binding without
consent.89 The notion of “epistemic proceduralism”—that democratic
law making must utilize procedures that have a tendency to make
correct decisions—thus stands at the center of Estlund’s claims.90
Though he does not go into the details of institutional design,91 his
Id. at 133. Somewhat confusingly, Rawls sometimes seems to suggest that public reason’s
constraints also apply to ordinary law making, not just to fundamental political questions. For
example, Rawls writes that public reason “has five different aspects,” one of which is the
application of a “family of reasonable political conceptions of justice ... in discussions of
coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people.” Id. Rawls
also states that public reason limits the types of reasons that properly can be drawn upon
when “exercis[ing] final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and
in amending their constitution.” Id. at 214. No more need be said about the scope of public
reason for present purposes because the less exacting “criterion of reciprocity” applies to
ordinary legislation and constitutes a public good requirement, as discussed above.
84. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1690 (1984).
85. See id.; see also RAWLS, supra note 66, at 16-17.
86. See ESTLUND, supra note 75, at 3, 9.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 7-8. Crucially, the procedure’s epistemic value also must be “publicly
recognizable”; that is to say, the procedure’s tendency to generate correct decisions must be
“generally acceptable [to citizens] in the way that political legitimacy requires.” Id. at 8.
89. See id. at 10, 117-35.
90. See id. at 7-10.
91. See id. at 2.
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theory implies the existence of some sort of public good requirement,
because democracy’s epistemic requirement cannot be satisfied if
lawmakers are permitted to pursue self-serving goals when acting
in their official capacities.92
* * * 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s public good requirement means that
certain motivations behind governmental action are illegitimate.
Accordingly, the second component of Republican Legitimacy invites
serious inquiry into the type of motivations and reasons that
legislators properly may rely upon—and those that they cannot—
when they legislate. This will receive further consideration later in
this Article.93
C. Anticipating Three Arguments Against Republican Legitimacy
Three arguments may be asserted against the claim above that
Republican Legitimacy is a constitutional principle. First, against
the claim concerning Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s public good
requirement regarding legislators, it might be argued that, regard-
less of what political theorists past and present may have thought,
any such requirement is inconsistent with the Madisonian system
that was adopted in our Constitution. Second, it might be argued
that the many well-known deficits in democracy that were present
during the Founding Era—best illustrated by the exclusion of
women, African Americans, and non-property-holding whites from
voting—undermine the claim that there is a constitutional principle
of Legitimate-Selection. Third, it might be argued that what I call
Republican Legitimacy is already, and better, addressed by what
some cases and commentators have called “anti-corruption.” I de-
velop, and refute, each of these arguments below. 
92. Indeed, Estlund alludes to such a conclusion at one of the few places in his book where
he briefly considers his theory’s concrete institutional implications. See id. at 20 (“[I]f points
of view get their influence on public conclusions by virtue of the wealth they have at their
disposal, public reasoning will be seriously distorted unless this irrational element of power
can somehow be countervailed in creative political practice.”).
93. See infra Part III.C.1.b.
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1. The Argument Against Legitimate-Decisionmaking: Madison
and “Our Constitution”
It might be argued that regardless of what the niceties of political
theory might suggest, our Constitution’s Madisonian compromise is
inconsistent with the claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is a
constitutional principle. In the Federalist Papers, Madison famously
wrote that men are not “angels,”94 that the Constitution accordingly
relies on the principles that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition,” and that “the private interest of every individual may be
a sentinel over the public rights.”95 Quoting this, Professor Adrian
Vermeuel argues that Madison believed that “suppressing self-
interest at its source is infeasible,” and that Madison instead chose
to “leav[e] self-interested motives in place while constricting the
opportunities available to self-interested decisionmakers” and to
thereby “control[ ] the effects rather than the causes of self-
interest.”96 Similarly, it has been argued that Madison’s ideas are a
foundation for, if not a precursor of, public choice theory,97 which
posits that politics is a forum where individuals simply ought to
pursue their individual interests.98
Any such Madisonian critique of public good requirements is
unavailing for several reasons. First, it relies on a partial reading,
if not a misreading, of Madison.99 Madison’s discussion of “ambition
... counteract[ing] ambition” occurs in the context of his explanation
of how “the necessary partition of power among the several depart-
ments as laid down in the Constitution” are to be maintained.100
Madison, thus, was discussing how the powers of the three branches
of the federal government were to be kept distinct. Madison’s
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”).
95. Id.
96. VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 36.
97. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 10 (1991).
98. See, e.g., Henry W. Chapell, Jr. & William R. Keech, Electoral Institutions in The
Federalist Papers: A Contemporary Perspective, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM 39, 39-41 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989).
99. For a similar argument, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-45 (1985).
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 94, at 320 (James Madison).
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solution was to “giv[e] to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others.”101 So Madison’s discussion of “per-
sonal motives” is not a license for legislators to pursue their
individual preferences when legislating, but instead refers to the
powers and motivations for members of each branch to guard
against, what Madison deemed to be, problematic encroachments
from the other branches.102
Indeed, Madison repeatedly spoke of the legislature’s pursuit of
the “public good” and “public weal,”103 and argued that representa-
tive democracy is more apt than direct democracy to pursue the
public good: 
[T]he delegation of the government ... to a small number of
citizens elected by the rest ... [will] refine and enlarge the public
views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.104
Madison made a related argument in Federalist No. 57:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess the most wisdom to discern,
and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in
the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.105
These are not the words of someone who wants or expects legislators
to pursue their individual interests when they legislate. To the
contrary, Madison’s expectation seems to be that legislators would
be better suited than citizens to pursue the public good. 
101. Id. at 321-22.
102. For a critical discussion of Madison’s view that each department’s powers were to be
kept distinct, see Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051,
1052-57 (2010).
103. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 37, at 82 (James Madison).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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There are other reasons why Madison’s views, whatever they
might be, should not be seen as a refutation of the necessity of a
“public good” requirement. Madison was addressing the best way of
structuring an alternative to monarchy, and why the proposed con-
stitution should be ratified. The public good requirement, however,
concerns something very different: an account of why, and under
what conditions, republican governments can legitimately coerce
their citizens. Although political theorists before Madison labored
to justify the legitimacy of the exercise of governmental power,106
this was not Madison’s task, most likely because it was not the core
issue on the minds of the American people at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification. After all, some form of democracy was
surely better than monarchy, and that was sufficient to recommend
it as the desired political form.107
Moreover, questions concerning the legitimacy of a democracy’s
exercise of power over its citizens may not have had much resonance
at that time, given that only a fraction of citizens had the right to
vote or hold office.108 By contrast, questions of legitimacy are
pressing in the modern era in which democracy is widespread,
monarchy is rare, the concept of political equality among citizens is
entrenched, and there is pervasive recognition that people will
probably never converge on what constitutes the “good life.”109 In
this environment, the question of what legitimates the majority’s
exercise of power over a dissenting minority is pressing. Modernity
permits, if not invites, the progressive refinements of enduring
governmental institutions that were created in a relatively short
period of time by people who had limited experience with democracy
and access to no models of large democratic institutions for guid-
106. For example, explaining the legitimacy of governmental power was central to both
Locke and Rousseau, as discussed above. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
Indeed, during debates concerning the scope of the franchise in the aftermath of the
Revolutionary War, a handful of Americans made this argument as well. See ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
10-12 (rev. ed. 2009). 
107. This should not be surprising, for Madison was not a systematic political theorist.
Robert Dahl demonstrates the profound theoretical inadequacies of Madison’s political
theories, concluding that Madison’s Federalist Papers are better understood as an “ideology”
that was designed to serve the political purpose of finding common ground to facilitate
ratification. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (rev. ed. 2006).
108. See KEYSSAR, supra note 106, at 3-21 (describing the limited franchise at that time).
109. See, e.g., GAUS, supra note 66, at 2; RAWLS, supra note 66, at 178-83.
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ance.110 We should welcome, not denigrate, the opportunity to refine
aspects of our democratic system that did not receive considered
attention from the Founders. 
The previous paragraph may resonate with “living constitutional-
ists,” but would it be acceptable to originalists? The next subsection
explains why it should be. 
2. The Argument Against Legitimate-Selection: The
“Democracy-Deficit Refutation”
Significantly more than half of the adult population did not have
the franchise in 1789; all states except New Jersey withheld the
franchise from women,111 most states had property qualifications,112
slaves could not vote, and several states excluded even free
blacks.113 As a matter of principle, it is impossible to square such
widespread disenfranchisement with Legitimate-Selection.114 As a
doctrinal matter, however, the Founding Era’s democracy deficit
does not undermine this Article’s claim that Legitimate-Selection is
a constitutional principle for three reasons.
110. See ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 8-9 (2d ed.
2003) (“It is no detraction from the genius of Leonardo da Vinci to say that given the
knowledge available in his time he could not possibly have designed a workable airplane ....
The knowledge of the Framers—some of them, certainly—may well have been the best
available in 1787. But reliable knowledge about constitutions appropriate to a large
representative republic was, at best, meager. History had produced no truly relevant models
of representative government on the scale the United States had already attained, not to
mention the scale it would reach in the years to come.”).
111. See KEYSSAR, supra note 106, at 43-44. New Jersey ultimately disenfranchised women
in 1807. See id.
112. Only Vermont, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Georgia had no property
requirements. See id. at 306-07 tbl.A.1. New Hampshire imposed a poll tax, whereas
Pennsylvania and Georgia required the voter to pay public taxes prior to the election. See id.
Every other state had property requirements. See id.
113. Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia formally extended the franchise only to whites.
See id. However, the number of states that excluded blacks “rose steadily from 1790 to 1850.”
Id. at 44.
114. Though beyond the scope of this Article, some contemporary exclusions might be
indefensible as well. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974) (upholding felony
disenfranchisement).
398 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:371
a. History
History provides the first reason. As Akhil Amar explains, much
happened “in the nation’s first eighty years to give rise to a more
robustly egalitarian and nationalistic conception of republican
government than had prevailed in the 1780s,” including a “dramatic
expansion of suffrage rights, at least among white men.”115 When
Congress undertook acts in the nineteenth century that were
predicated on the Guarantee Clause, Congress relied upon its more
robust contemporary understanding of republicanism and not that
of the Framers.116 For example, Congress “judg[ed] local republican-
ism by applying dynamic democratic standards in the course of
admitting new Western states,” ensuring that the new states “met
contemporary standards of republicanism.”117 Further, influential
members of the Reconstruction Congress, including Senator Charles
Sumner and Representative John Bingham, justified Congress’s
refusal to readmit the southern states following the Civil War on the
ground that those states’ disenfranchisement of free blacks rendered
them unrepublican.118 As Amar notes, “[b]y 1865, any state that
automatically disenfranchised a quarter or more of its freemen—as
did each ex-rebel state—was out of the American mainstream in a
way that it would not have been in 1787.”119 In other words, it was
the prevailing understanding of republicanism in 1865, not the
Framers’ understanding, that was the basis for refusing automatic
readmission of the southern states after the Civil War.
This historical record gives rise to the first reason why the
democracy-deficit refutation is without force: our understandings of
Republican Legitimacy should not be limited by the rules of the road
that were in place at our nation’s founding.120 Rather, requirements
of republicanism are appropriately determined on the basis of
contemporary understandings. A dynamic approach to understand-
115. AMAR, supra note 37, at 370.
116. See id. at 370-71.
117. Id. at 371.
118. See id. at 370-76.
119. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
120. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that Professor Amar necessarily would agree
with this Article’s conclusion that Republican Legitimacy is a constitutional principle.
Professor Amar’s methodology does provide, however, resources for countering the possible
counterarguments to my constitutional claim that are anticipated above in the text.
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ing republicanism is consistent with longstanding historical
practice. 
Two possible counterarguments may be asserted. First, the fact
that Congress understood republicanism dynamically does not mean
this was correct; perhaps Congress acted for unprincipled self-
serving reasons121 or simply made a mistake. Second, in the alter-
native, such dynamic interpretation may be appropriate for
Congress, but not for courts. These two counterarguments, however,
are refuted by the second reason, discussed immediately below, as
to why the democracy-deficit refutation is without force. 
b. Meaning Versus Application 
The democracy-deficit refutation has maximal traction under
originalist premises. After all, whereas Legitimate-Selection re-
quires widespread franchise, the Founders countenanced a system
of widespread disenfranchisement at both the state and federal
levels.122 And this disenfranchisement was not a result of oversight
but instead was an outgrowth of a theory of politics under which
voting was seen as a “privilege” rather than a right, where only
those with a “stake in society” were “sufficiently attached to the
community and sufficiently affected by its laws to have earned the
privilege of voting,” and where women were legally merged into
their husbands, who were thought to virtually represent them
through their votes.123 Though our country’s early democracy deficit
might be troubling even to those who do not label themselves “orig-
inalists”—for even they think history and tradition are relevant to
constitutional interpretation124—those who do not self-identify as
originalists rely on other considerations that allow for changing
constitutional interpretations.125 The Founding Era democracy
deficit, however, might appear to be an intractable obstacle for an
121. For such a claim, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 106-07
(1998). For Amar’s response, see AMAR, supra note 37, at 375, 604-05 & n.44.
122. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
123. See KEYSSAR, supra note 106, at 8.
124. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 8 (2005).
125. See, e.g., id. at 8-9.
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originalist to conclude that Legitimate-Selection is a constitutional
principle that requires widespread franchise.
But this is not the case. Let us assume that an originalist were to
agree with the textual and structural claims advanced in this
Part, that there must be a constitutional principle of Republican
Legitimacy. Modern-day originalists could easily conclude that our
country’s early democracy deficit does not defeat the meaning of
Republican Legitimacy advanced here. This is because most con-
temporary originalists draw a distinction between constitutional
meaning, which they believe is binding, and actual or expected ap-
plications of the Constitution, which they believe are not binding.126
This distinction allows them to conclude that a specific view or
practice that coexisted with a constitutional enactment—say the
“views or expectations of some individuals at the time [of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption] that the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment’s principle did not extend to segregated education”—was a
nonbinding “application” or “mistake[ ]” that is distinct from the
binding original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.127
126. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
622 (1999) (distinguishing “semantic” from “expectations” originalism and concluding that
“how the relevant generation of ratifiers expected or intended their textual handiwork would
be applied to specific cases” is relevant only as “circumstantial evidence of what the more
technical words and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable listener”); Michael
W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997)
(“Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of particular applications could
be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2059 (2006)
(rejecting a description of originalism as being a “version of crude intentionalism that focuses
on the specific subjective intentions or expectations of individuals as to how a provision might
be applied ... rather than focusing on the objective linguistic meaning of the words of a text
(taken in historical context)”); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT
W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 11 (2011)
(“[I]t is the public meaning of the test (the linguistic meaning) that provides binding law.
Expectations about the application of the text to particular cases or general types of cases
provide relevant evidence of linguistic meaning, but it is only evidence.”). It is worth noting
that the meaning/application distinction also is important for some nonoriginalists. See, e.g.,
James Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV.
1523, 1539 (2011) (“The Constitution, properly understood, is not frozen in time and
inextricably linked to the concrete expectations of the framers or ratifiers. But neither does
its meaning change.... What can change, however, is the application of those principles over
time, based on technological, economic, and cultural changes.”).
127. Paulsen, supra note 126, at 2060 & n.43.
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Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman provide the most important
theoretical explanation for the distinction between binding meaning
and nonbinding applications, and it is useful to work through their
analysis to demonstrate more precisely why an originalist could
conclude that our country’s early democracy deficit is a nonbinding
application of republicanism rather than a binding meaning.128 Like
many other commentators, Greenberg and Litman understand
“meaning” to refer to a word’s more abstract, general articulation
and understand “application” to refer to the concrete particulars
that fall within a word’s “meaning.”129 Greenberg and Litman then
argue that applications are the result of a meaning’s interaction
with factors extrinsic to meaning. In their words, “application may
not be a reliable guide to meaning,”130 because “meaning is only one
determinant of the things to which the speaker would apply the
word.”131 Greenberg and Litman go on to claim that a “speaker’s
substantive beliefs” may affect application,132 and conclude that
“disagreement over whether a term applies in a particular case can
be, and generally is, a substantive disagreement, rather than a
128. See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569, 586-88 (1998). Mitch Berman has commented that Greenberg and Litman’s article
“demolished” the proposition that “expected applications of constitutional provisions are
binding on present-day interpreters.” Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents
(Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385 (2007). I concur as to
the article’s depth and importance, though I do not agree with all of its analysis. I nonetheless
rely on Greenberg and Litman’s article for present purposes because it has been influential
for originalists and it aims to show that originalists have reasons internal to their
commitments to reject the democracy-deficit refutation. My approach is similar to the
Rawlsian idea of reasoning from conjecture. See RAWLS, supra note 66, at 155-56 (defining
conjecture as arguing “from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines”
even though “we do not assert [that is to say, personally accept or believe] the premises from
which we argue, but ... we proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a misunder-
standing on others’ part”). 
129. See Greenberg & Litman, supra note 128, at 586-91; see also Solum, supra note 126,
at 149 (“The linguistic meaning of [a] phrase is the more general meaning.”). This is not the
only way that one can understand meaning. For one brief critique, see Robert W. Bennett,
Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE, supra note 126, at 78, 113 (critiquing the underlying assumption of many who
distinguish between meaning and application that “the meaning of vague or general language
must itself be general”). A work-in-progress of mine builds on Wittgenstein’s theory of
meaning to criticize and limit Greenberg and Litman’s argument. See Mark D. Rosen, Stop
the Beach and Originalism (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
130. Greenberg & Litman, supra note 128, at 591.
131. Id. at 588. 
132. Id. at 588-89 (emphasis added). 
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misunderstanding about the word’s meaning, because what a word
is applied to depends not only on meaning but also on substantive
views.”133
For example, Greenberg and Litman note that the Founders
would not have expected that the Contract Clause would operate
with respect to a married woman’s contract.134 But this was because,
during the Founding Era, a married woman was not thought to be
able to enter into her own contracts; her legal personality was
conceptualized as having merged with her husband’s.135 Greenberg
and Litman plausibly conclude that the Founders’ expectations
concerning married women’s contracts are a nonbinding application
and thus are not part of the meaning of the Contract Clause.136 The
Founders’ expectation that the Contract Clause would not apply to
married women’s contracts, say Greenberg and Litman, was due to
a substantive belief external to the meaning of the Contract Clause,
namely that married women could not create valid contracts.137
Accordingly, that expectation is nonbinding, and an originalist could
conclude today that the Contract Clause applies to contracts made
by married women.138
Similarly, it seems plausible to say that our country’s early
democracy deficit, or many aspects of it, at least, was due to sub-
stantive beliefs extrinsic to the meaning of republicanism; for
instance, the views that women could be virtually represented by
their husbands, that a woman’s proper place was only in the dom-
estic sphere, that women and non-whites did not have the requisite
intelligence or moral attributes to participate in politics, or that only
property holders had a stake in society.139 All of these are “substan-
tive beliefs” that are extrinsic to the meaning of republicanism, and
the concrete applications they produced accordingly would not be
binding on Greenberg and Litman’s account. For this reason, even
originalists can reject the democracy-deficit refutation.
133. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 585.
135. See id. at 585 & n.73.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See KEYSSAR, supra note 106, at 8.
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Michael McConnell, professor and former judge, has put forward
another reason for distinguishing between meaning and application.
McConnell states that “[m]ainstream originalists recognize that the
Framers’ analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that
circumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”140
McConnell presents a more limited justification than Greenberg and
Litman, because on the latters’ account, applications can properly
shift as substantive beliefs change even if the earlier substantive
belief was not necessarily wrong.141 But even McConnell’s more
limited understanding concerning the distinction between binding
meaning and nonbinding applications would suffice for present
purposes; my guess is that most originalists would concede that our
country’s early widespread franchise exclusions were either “wrong,”
or that “circumstances ... have changed and made them wrong” vis-
à-vis what republicanism requires. If so, originalists’ understanding
of the constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy need not be
limited by virtue of our country’s early democracy deficit. And this
is yet another reason why originalists can reject the democracy-
deficit refutation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the accounts of both McConnell
and Greenberg and Litman provide theoretical justifications for
Congress’s dynamic approach to understanding what republicanism
requires, as documented by Amar. These accounts also provide a
retort to the possibility raised at the conclusion of the last subsec-
tion that only Congress properly has this power; there is no reason
to conclude that courts would not have a role in sorting out binding
meanings from nonbinding applications. 
c. Post-Guarantee Clause Amendments
There is a final reason to reject the democracy-deficit refutation.
As Professor Amar has forcefully argued, and as many originalists
agree, the Constitution’s text should be read holistically, taking into
account not only the original Constitution, but its amendments as
well142:
140. McConnell, supra note 126, at 1284.
141. See, e.g., Greenberg & Litman, supra note 128, at 584.
142. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) (“The American People ratified the Philadelphia
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Each amendment aims to fit with, and be read as part of, the
larger document. Indeed, because the People have chosen to affix
amendments to the end of the document rather than directly
rewrite old clauses, a reader can never simply look to an old
clause and be done with it. Rather, she must always scour later
amendments to see if they explicitly or implicitly modify the
clause at hand.143
Accordingly, it would be incorrect to interpret the original
Constitution’s “republican form of government” clause without
taking account of the many amendments that have “expanded our
democracy by making citizens of former slaves, expanding the right
to vote to include women and eighteen year-olds[,] ... abolishing the
poll tax[,] ... [and] increas[ing] the voice and power of ordinary
citizens by allowing for the direct election of senators.”144 Amar
relies on these Amendments to conclude that the Guarantee Clause
should be read “broadly” and “dynamically” such that exclusions
from the franchise that were acceptable during the Founding Era
would not be constitutional today145: “We the People today must be
expansive even if We the People at one time were less so.”146 Amar’s
reasoning is not limited to the question of franchise but extends
more generally to the circumstances that must obtain for republican
government to be both legitimate and stable—that is, to Republican
Legitimacy.147
3. Republican Legitimacy or Anti-Corruption? 
It might be argued that Republican Legitimacy is an unnecessary
concept because it merely duplicates what some cases and scholarly
writing have dubbed “anti-corruption.”148 This criticism fails because
Constitution not clause by clause, but as a single document. Later generations of Americans
have added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a discrete legal
regime.”). For a ringing endorsement of Amar’s originalist methodology by an important
originalist, see Paulsen, supra note 126, at 2037.
143. Amar, supra note 142, at 29-30 (emphasis added).
144. Ryan, supra note 126, at 1549.
145. Amar, supra note 142, at 49-51.
146. Id. at 51.
147. See id. at 49. To be clear, the argument above extends Amar’s reasoning but does not
claim that Amar agrees with its conclusion. I have not asked him.
148. See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 10, at 342.
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Republican Legitimacy is a doctrinally and conceptually superior
framework for two main reasons. 
First, there is more solid textual grounding in the Constitution for
concluding that Republican Legitimacy is an independent constitu-
tional principle than there is for anti-corruption. Constitutional
text—the Guarantee Clause—speaks explicitly about republicanism,
but no constitutional provision mentions corruption.149 Though the
Guarantee Clause only extends its reach to states, it is hard to
imagine that the federal government would have been charged with
the responsibility of guaranteeing states a republican form of
government if the federal government itself were not republican in
form. And, of course, the Constitution explicitly creates a republican
form of government at the federal level by having the people elect
Congress150—something that Madison trumpeted in the Federalist
Papers.151 Once it is accepted that the Constitution establishes and
guarantees republican forms of government at the federal and state
levels, the conclusion that Republican Legitimacy is itself of
constitutional stature readily follows: the Constitution’s creation
and guarantee of republican forms of government includes the
minimum conditions that are necessary to ensure the stability and
effectiveness of these institutions.152
It is harder to show that anti-corruption is an independent
constitutional principle. Indeed, all but one of the proponents of
anti-corruption treat it as a compelling government interest,153 not
149. Another phrase akin to Republican Legitimacy, “democratic integrity,” also has
appeared in some case law. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 522 (2007)
(Souter, J., dissenting). While I view the phrase “democratic integrity” as being virtually
interchangeable with Republican Legitimacy, I prefer the latter for three reasons: (1)
“republican” is more accurate because the Justices invoking “democratic integrity” have been
referring to law making by representatives rather than the people themselves; (2) “legitimacy”
more accurately describes the idea that appropriately informs its contents than does
“integrity” insofar as political theorists use “legitimacy” to refer to the conditions that must
pertain for a polity’s laws to be morally binding on citizens, see May, supra note 55; and (3)
“republican” facilitates recognition that Republican Legitimacy is an independent
constitutional principle, for reasons explained above in the text. I recognize—and criticize the
fact—that the proponents of “democratic integrity” have not treated it as a constitutional
principle but instead as a compelling governmental interest. See infra Part II.C.1. 
150. See supra Part I.A for a full discussion of how the Constitution creates a republican
form of government vis-à-vis both Congress and the President.
151. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 37, at 82-83 (James Madison). 
152. For the complete argument, see supra Part I.A-B.
153. While my proposal at present may be subject to the same criticism, see infra Part II.C
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as a stand-alone constitutional principle.154 Professor Teachout has
provided an elegant and illuminating argument that anti-corruption
rises to the level of a constitutional principle. Although I am very
sympathetic to her project, her constitutional argument is subject
to a fundamental critique from which Republican Legitimacy is
immune. Teachout grounds her constitutional conclusion in two
virtually unassailable premises: (1) the Founders were concerned
with the corruption of republican governments and (2) many
provisions of the Constitution were directed at countering corrup-
tion.155 But her conclusion—that a stand-alone constitutional anti-
corruption principle exists—does not follow from these premises.
The fact that many constitutional provisions are designed to counter
corruption hardly establishes that there also exists a free-floating
constitutional anti-corruption principle alongside these constitution-
ally created anti-corruption features. After all, it could equally, or,
arguably, even more persuasively, be said that the specific institu-
tional features that the Constitution establishes to counter corrup-
tion exhaust the Constitution’s anti-corruption provisions. 
Second, Republican Legitimacy is conceptually superior to anti-
corruption insofar as it better indicates its appropriate content than
does anti-corruption. My critique of Citizens United in Part III
demonstrates this proposition at length.156 The explanation of
Republican Legitimacy’s conceptual superiority can begin here,
though, with a critical analysis of Professor Teachout’s definition of
(noting that the case law addressing aspects of Republican Legitimacy has treated them as
compelling governmental interests, not as a stand-alone constitutional principle), the
doctrinal arguments for elevating Republican Legitimacy to a constitutional level are stronger
than those for elevating anti-corruption.
154. Indeed, Professor Issacharoff ’s recent article considers what understanding of
corruption could justify campaign finance regulations vis-à-vis free speech challenges but does
not argue that anti-corruption constitutes an independent constitutional principle. See
Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 119-21 (2010). Supreme
Court case law likewise has treated political corruption as a compelling governmental
interest. See infra Part II.C.1. But see Teachout, supra note 10, at 343 (arguing that anti-
corruption is a “freestanding constitutional principle”). 
155. She rightly observes that “[t]he size of the [House of Representatives and the Senate],
the mode of election, the limits on holding multiple offices, the limitations on accepting foreign
gifts, and the veto override provision were all considered in light of concerns about corruption,
and designed to limit legislators’ opportunities to serve themselves.” Teachout, supra note 10,
at 354. Teachout also relies on prohibition on titles of nobility, the treaty-making power, and
the jury requirement in federal courts to ground her thesis. See id. at 355.
156. See infra Part III.C. 
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political corruption. She says that political corruption is (1) “the use
of [the] public forum to pursue private ends” and that (2) its
“centerpiece ... is intent.”157 From the vantage point of Republican
Legitimacy, the first part of Teachout’s definition is accurate but
incomplete; it correctly points to Legitimate-Decisionmaking, but
problematically omits Legitimate-Selection. To illustrate the costs
of Teachout’s conception, it provides no basis for criticizing partisan
gerrymandering by stalwart Republicans who aim to minimize the
number of elected Democrats, not for the pursuit of “private ends”
but because they earnestly believe the Democrats’ agenda to be bad
for the country. Republican Legitimacy, by contrast, provides a basis
for concluding that such partisan gerrymandering is wrong even if
the gerrymanderers were not pursuing “private ends.”158 Likewise,
whereas anti-corruption has nothing to say about the gaming of
voter registration requirements to suppress voting for partisan
advantage, such activities fall squarely within the purview of
Republican Legitimacy.
The second part of Teachout’s definition—the intent requirement
—is flatly wrong from the perspective of Republican Legitimacy. The
legitimacy of the republican system can be undercut by negligence,
oversight, and even well-intended actions. Actions that threaten
Republican Legitimacy, accordingly, should be deemed unconsti-
tutional regardless of intent. Although corruption without wrongful
intent might well be an oxymoron, intent’s irrelevance makes
perfect sense within the conceptual framework of Republican
Legitimacy.
Interestingly, Professor Issacharoff ’s recent Harvard Law Review
article On Political Corruption, a masterful explication of corrup-
tion, actually strengthens the case for Republican Legitimacy. This
is so because the conception of “political corruption” that Issacharoff
ultimately champions is virtually identical to Republican Legiti-
macy. Look carefully at Issacharoff ’s analysis:
Any constitutional test resting on corruption as the evil to be
avoided begs for a definition of the good, or, in this case, the
157. Teachout, supra note 10, at 382; see also id. at 374-77 (defending the “understanding
of corruption [that] focuses the discussion on the intent” of the actors).
158. See infra Part III.B (discussing partisan gerrymandering from the perspective of
Republican Legitimacy). 
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uncorrupted. As in many areas of law in which the good state
resists simple definition, the first insight may come from process
questions—which campaign finance procedures are likely to
promote desirable forms of democratic governance and which are
likely to promote infirmities in democracy?159
Since Issacharoff is discussing campaign finance, it is clear that
when he speaks of “democratic governance” he actually means
“representative democracy.” And representative democracy, of
course, is interchangeable with republicanism. If Issacharoff ’s pur-
pose is to generate legal tests that “promote desirable forms of
[representative] democratic governance” and avoid “infirmities in
[representative] democracy,” it would seem that “corruption” does
not perform any real analytical work.160 Standing at the center of
Issacharoff ’s analysis, instead, are considerations of what makes
republican forms of government work well—considerations that are
more accurately captured by the term Republican Legitimacy. It is
better to use the more accurate terminology because, as will be
explained shortly, the term “corruption” is misleading.161
II. THE CASE LAW BEARING ON REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY
Having derived Republican Legitimacy through textual and
structural analysis of the Constitution, and elucidated Republican
Legitimacy’s contents through political theory, I show in this Part
to what extent Republican Legitimacy can be said to be already
present in the case law. To provide a quick overview, the two cases
discussed in Part II.A provide some basis—albeit an inadequately
theorized one—for concluding that Legitimate-Selection is a consti-
tutional principle. Part II.B shows many other cases where the
Court has recognized the components of Republican Legitimacy. 
These decisions are exceedingly helpful for three reasons: they
help flesh out the contents of Republican Legitimacy; they authenti-
cate, for those who put trust in inductive reasoning, the conclusions
of Part I.B’s top-down, deductive reasoning; and they provide a
precedential foothold for this Article’s claim. But the case law does
159. Issacharoff, supra note 154, at 126-27 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 125-27.
161. See infra Part III.C (critiquing Citizens United).
2012] REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY 409
not give Republican Legitimacy its full due, and, hence, it does not
qualify as decisive precedent for this Article’s claim, for two reasons.
First, most of the cases treat the preservation of conditions neces-
sary to maintain the legitimacy of republicanism as sufficiently
important governmental interests to justify regulation, but not as
having independent constitutional status. Second, most of the cases
have assimilated the preservation of the conditions necessary to
maintain republicanism into individual rights doctrines instead of
recognizing them as aspects of a structural constitutional principle.
Part II.C explains why these two limits of the case law are signifi-
cant. In so doing, Part II establishes why it is important to recognize
Republican Legitimacy as (1) a stand-alone constitutional principle
that is (2) structural rather than rights based. 
A. The Most Direct Precedent for the Proposition that Republican
Legitimacy Is an Independent Constitutional Principle
One Supreme Court case squarely recognized that the prerequi-
sites of representative democracy themselves can have constitu-
tional status. An earlier case arguably held so as well. It makes
sense to discuss the cases chronologically because the second case
relied on the first. 
Powell v. McCormack invoked the “fundamental principle of our
representative democracy” as a guide to interpreting a consti-
tutional grant of power to Congress.162 The question was whether
the provision in the Constitution that “[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the ... [q]ualifications of its own Members”163 gave the
House the power to exclude a duly elected member on separate
grounds from the three requirements—age, citizenship, and
residency—specified elsewhere in the Constitution.164 The Court
held that “the Constitution does not vest in the Congress a discre-
tionary power to deny membership by a majority vote,” relying, inter
alia, on “an examination of the basic principles of our democratic
162. 395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
164. Id. § 2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); see also
Powell, 395 U.S. at 489.
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system.”165 A congressional power to discretionarily exclude duly
elected congresspersons, continued the Court, would violate the
“fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that “the
people should choose whom they please to govern them.”166
Powell’s principle of “representative democracy” is synonymous
with the contemporary understanding of republicanism.167 Powell’s
principle is an aspect of Legitimate-Selection, the first component
of Republican Legitimacy. And Powell is surely correct that a discre-
tionary congressional power to exclude properly elected congress-
persons would undermine the legitimacy of our representative
process, bottomed as it is on the commitment that the citizens of
each district have the power to choose their representative. For
these reasons, Powell is strong precedent in support of Republican
Legitimacy, or at least its first component. 
But there are two important caveats. First, Powell does not ex-
plain where its crucial decisional principle comes from but merely
asserts it ipse dixit. The derivation provided earlier in this Article,
however, provides solid grounding for Powell’s principle of “repre-
sentative democracy.”168 Second, Powell did not necessarily hold that
its principle of “representative democracy” has constitutional status;
Powell used representative democracy as an interpretive rule for
construing a constitutional text, and interpretive rules do not neces-
sarily themselves have the status of a constitutional principle.169
Notwithstanding the two caveats above, the Supreme Court
treated Powell’s “fundamental principle” as a full-fledged constitu-
tional principle in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.170 Thornton
struck down an amendment to Arkansas’s constitution that set term
limits for that state’s federal representatives.171 Thornton’s self-
proclaimed “most important[ ]” ground for its decision172 was that
term limits violated the “fundamental principle of our representa-
tive democracy ... [that] the people should choose whom they please
165. Powell, 395 U.S. at 547-48 (emphasis added). The Court also considered the Framers’
intent “to the extent it [could] be determined.” Id. at 548.
166. Id. at 547 (citation omitted).
167. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part I.B.2.
169. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
170. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
171. See id. at 837-38.
172. Id. at 806.
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to govern them.”173 In doing so, Thornton treated Powell’s principle
as a constitutional principle, for Thornton considered it a sufficient
basis for overturning the Arkansas law.174 “Representative democ-
racy” is synonymous with republicanism, and Thornton’s holding
squarely concerned republicanism, striking down an aspect of the
electoral system that the Court believed interfered with the process
by which the people select their representatives. Thornton, accord-
ingly, is solid precedent for the proposition that Legitimate-
Selection is a constitutional principle. 
But there are gaps in Thornton’s analysis. First, Thornton did not
give a satisfactory explanation of the source of the “fundamental
principle of our representative democracy”; it merely cited to Powell,
which in turn merely asserted it.175 Second, Thornton provided little
guidance as to its constitutional principle’s appropriate scope.
Fortunately, this Article’s earlier analysis in Part I.A and B ad-
dresses both of these gaps. 
B. Additional Cases that Address the Two Components of    
Republican Legitimacy
Many cases have recognized the significance of considerations
that fall under the two components of Republican Legitimacy.
1. The First Component: Legitimate-Selection 
Let us first consider case law that has addressed matters that fall
under Legitimate-Selection, the first component of Republican
Legitimacy. The 1969 decision of Kramer v. Union Free School
District concerned the constitutionality of a statute that barred an
adult who lived with his parents from voting in a school board
election176: “[S]tatutes distributing the franchise constitute the
foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimina-
tion in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representa-
173. Id. at 783 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 547) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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tive government.”177 The Court in Kramer struck down the statute,
but on equal protection grounds.178 The Court did not recognize the
concerns above to be an independent constitutional principle. 
The per curiam decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez also addressed
Legitimate-Selection when it tied its reasoning to the conditions
that are necessary for republicanism to successfully operate.179
Purcell vacated an interlocutory injunction and thereby allowed
state and county officials to apply Arizona’s new voter identification
rules.180 The Court explained that “[c]onfidence in the integrity of
our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our par-
ticipatory democracy.”181 But Purcell held that “preserving the
integrity of [a state’s] election process” constituted a “compelling
interest,”182 not an independent constitutional principle. 
The most extensive discussion of the considerations that fall
under the rubric of Legitimate-Selection is found in campaign fi-
nance case law. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission used the
concept of Legitimate-Selection to frame its discussion of a century
of federal campaign regulations: 
More than a century ago the ‘sober-minded Elihu Root’
advocated legislation that would prohibit political contributions
by corporations in order to prevent ‘the great aggregations of
wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,’
to elect legislators who would ‘vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.’ In
Root’s opinion, such legislation would ‘strik[e] at a constantly
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the
plain people of small means of this country in our political
institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained
since the foundation of our Government.’ The Congress of the
United States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing
Root's judgment.183
177. Id. at 626.
178. Id. at 630-33.
179. 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
180. See id. at 5.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id.
183. 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (quoting United States v. Int’l Union United Auto. Workers
of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)) (internal citations omitted).
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Supreme Court Justices also have relied on considerations of
Legitimate-Selection when striking down campaign finance regu-
lations. In Randall v. Sorrell, the Court found unconstitutional a
state campaign finance statute that imposed a $200 per-candidate,
per-election contribution limit for candidates running for state
office.184 Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, explained that, although contribution limits are not per se
unconstitutional, courts must “recognize the existence of some lower
bound” because “[a]t some point the constitutional risks to the dem-
ocratic electoral process become too great.”185 Contribution limits
that are too low can “harm the electoral process by preventing chal-
lengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent of-
ficeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.”186 Though
Breyer’s reasoning reflected structural concerns, his plurality
opinion grounded its holding in the First Amendment.187
2. The Second Component: Legitimate-Decisionmaking
Concerns that are part of Legitimate-Decisionmaking, the second
component of Republican Legitimacy, also have been recognized by
the Supreme Court. But before turning to that case law, three
preliminary observations are in order. To date, the Court’s analysis
has been institution specific, with each case focusing on the branch
of government—the legislature, the judiciary, or the executive—
whose actions were the subject of the litigation. This is sensible in-
sofar as each institution is genuinely distinctive188 with respect to
both its vulnerabilities to improper decisionmaking and as to what
constitutes improper decisionmaking; for instance, a greater degree
of objectivity is expected of courts than of legislatures. Nonetheless,
that the Court recognized a category of wrongful decisionmaking
vis-à-vis all three branches confirms the proposition that
184. 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006).
185. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 249.
187. See id. at 261-62.
188. For an extended analysis of how the different institutional characteristics of each
branch of government should influence constitutional doctrine, see Mark D. Rosen, The
Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513
(2005).
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Legitimate-Decisionmaking is a meaningful category with respect
to governmental action as a general matter. 
a. The Legislature
Proceeding to the case law, the Court long has recognized
Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis legislatures. In United States
v. Wurzbach, a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holmes
upheld a statute that barred members of Congress from receiving
contributions for “any political purpose whatever” from any other
federal employees.189 The Court upheld the statute on the grounds
of Legitimate-Decisionmaking: “Congress may provide that its
officers and employees” shall not be “subjected to pressure for money
for political purposes, upon or by others of their kind, while they
retain their office or employment.”190
Consider as well the recent decision in Nevada Commission on
Ethics v. Carrigan.191 Nevada law prohibits state and municipal
legislators from “vot[ing] upon or advocat[ing] the passage or failure
of ” any “matter with respect to which the independence of judgment
of a reasonable person in his situation would be materially affected
by ... [h]is commitment in a private capacity to the interests of
others.”192 The Court upheld Nevada’s law against a First Amend-
ment challenge because, inter alia, such “generally applicable
conflict-of-interest recusal rule[s]” have been “commonplace for over
200 years” in both Congress and state legislatures.193 For example,
within a week of the United States House of Representatives having
obtained a quorum, it enacted a rule that “[n]o member shall vote
on any question, in the event of which he is immediately and
particularly interested.”194 And although “[t]he first Senate rules did
not include a recusal requirement, ... Thomas Jefferson adopted one
189. 280 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1930).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
192. Id. at 2346 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 281A.420(2) (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court understood that the statute barred legislators from “advocating passage
or failure [of the proposal in which he has a conflict] during the legislative debate.” Id. at
2347.
193. Id. at 2348. For more of the majority’s reasoning, see infra note 199.
194. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (1789)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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when he was President of the Senate.”195 It provided that, “[w]here
the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill or question,
he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
voice [is] disallowed.”196
Interestingly, Jefferson’s Senate rule justified itself by resort to
foundational principles of political theory similar to those invoked
above in Part I.B: 
In a case so contrary not only to the laws of decency, but to the
fundamental principles of the social compact, which denies to
any man to be a judge in his own case, it is for the honor of the
house that this rule, of immemorial observance, should be
strictly adhered to.197
Buttressing this Article’s claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is
not branch specific but instead is applicable to governmental action
in general, the Senate drew upon an analogy from the judiciary,
noting that a person may not be a “judge in his own case.”198 The
Carrigan decision likewise relied on the fact that “[f]ederal con-
flict-of-interest rules applicable to judges also date back to the
founding.”199
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF
THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801) [hereinafter MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE]) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
197. MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, supra note 196, at 31.
198. Id.
199. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348 (emphasis added). Curiously, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Carrigan did not uphold Nevada’s law on the ground that it was backed by a
compelling governmental interest but instead concluded that no speech rights were implicated
for two reasons. First, “legislative power is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the
people; the legislator has no personal right to it.” Id. at 2350. Second, “the act of voting [by a
legislator] symbolizes nothing” and therefore is not an “act of communication” to which the
First Amendment applies. Id.
The majority’s reasoning is peculiar. Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote separate
concurrences, with which I largely agree, that strongly criticized the majority’s premise that
antirecusal laws do not implicate speech. See id. at 2352-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2354-55 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as it
suggests that restrictions upon legislators’ voting are not restrictions upon legislators’
speech.”). Further, as to the majority’s first reason, it is in tension with Citizens United’s
confirmation of corporations’ First Amendment rights despite the fact that corporations
cannot be said to have “personal” rights. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899-900
(2010). It is more plausible to conclude that restrictions on legislators’ ability to advocate and
vote indeed restrict speech but that they are not “impermissible restrictions on freedom of
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The concern of Legitimate-Decisionmaking is also present in the
modern campaign finance case law. Since the landmark 1976
decision of Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has held that, “[t]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system
of representative democracy is undermined.”200 Behind Buckley’s
delegitimation of quid pro quo contributions is a theory of
Legitimate-Decisionmaking that identifies some motivations behind
congressional decisionmaking as being wrongful. 
To be sure, the scope of Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis
Congress has been a matter of deep controversy at the Supreme
Court. Many cases have recognized that Legitimate-Decisionmaking
demands the satisfaction of strict criteria. For example, in uphold-
ing the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
that banned national parties’ involvement with soft money, the
majority opinion in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission cited
to earlier cases that had recognized the legitimacy of regulations
aimed at combating “undue influence on an officeholder’s judg-
ment”201 and “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with
the wishes of large contributors.”202 McConnell also provided the
Court’s most expansive discussion to date of its theory of
Legitimate-Decisionmaking when it spoke of “the danger that
officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”203
However, in the Court’s more recent decision on this issue—the
controversial Citizens United case—a five Justice majority retreated
from McConnell’s view, holding instead that quid pro quo exchanges
are the only types of illegitimate decisionmaking that Congress can
speech” because there are sufficiently important interests—preserving Republican
Legitimacy—to justify them. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring).
200. 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). This holding has been reaffirmed countless
times, including in the Court’s recent decision of Citizens United, one which constituted a
severe retrenchment of campaign finance laws. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-11. 
201. 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431, 441 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 143 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. at 153.
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regulate.204 Justice Stevens’s lengthy dissent for four Justices
reiterated McConnell’s understanding that “undue influence”
extends beyond quid pro quo exchanges.205 Justice Stevens said
regulations combating such influences serve as “safeguard[s]” to
protect the very “legitimacy of our political system” against
“threat[s] to republican self-government.”206 Yet as important as
Citizens United is in having cut back the Court’s understanding of
Legitimate-Decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that all
Justices still accept some theory of Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-
à-vis Congress insofar as all the Justices deem quid pro quo
exchanges illegitimate.
b. The Executive Branch
The Court has also applied Legitimate-Decisionmaking to the
executive branch by upholding limits on the political activities of
federal executive branch employees. An 1882 case upheld a law pro-
hibiting federal employees “from giving or receiving money for
political purposes from or to other employees of the government.”207
More recent cases upheld the Hatch Act,208 which bars federal
employees from taking an “active part in political management or
political campaigns.”209 The Court upheld a wide array of statutory
204. See infra Part III.C.1.
205. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 963-64, 968-69.
207. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) (describing the holding of Ex
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882)).
208. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 (1973);
see also Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 93.
209. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 554.
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prohibitions210 on Legitimate-Decisionmaking grounds,211 crediting
Congress’s judgment that “an actively partisan governmental
personnel threatens good administration.”212 The Court endorsed
Congress’s concern regarding the “danger” to the public that “gov-
ernmental favor may be channeled through political connections” if
governmental workers were permitted to engage in the proscribed
activities.213 The Court upheld Congress’s support for the “principle
of required political neutrality for classified public servants” so as
to promote “integrity in the discharge of official duties” and to “deal
with what many sincere men believe is a material threat to the
democratic system.”214
c. The Judiciary
Finally, as to Legitimate-Decisionmaking in the judiciary, con-
sider the recent decision of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.215
Caperton held that a state supreme court justice should have re-
cused himself from a case in which the president and chief executive
officer of one of the parties had made substantial campaign contri-
butions for the justice’s reelection, at a time when the corporation
would likely be seeking review of the trial court’s entry of a $50
million judgment against the corporation.216 The Supreme Court
grounded its ruling in the proposition that “[a] fair trial in a fair
210. The Hatch Act barred employees of the executive branch from “holding a party office,
working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers,” and Congress
also could ban such employees from
organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fundraising
activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan
candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the
campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a
partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for
public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party
convention.
Id. at 556. 
211. See id. (“[N]either the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution
invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees.”). 
212. Id. at 555 (quoting Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 97-98).
213. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 97, 99.
215. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
216. Id. at 2256-57.
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tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,”217 and held that a
judge must recuse himself when “there is an unconstitutional
‘potential for bias’” on the basis of “a realistic appraisal of psycholog-
ical tendencies and human weakness.”218 Caperton found this stan-
dard to have been met “when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or immi-
nent.”219
C. Limitations of the Case Law
The case law surveyed above in Part II.B supports this Article’s
claim that Republican Legitimacy is an independent structural
constitutional principle, but does not fully establish the Article’s
claim for two reasons.
1. Compelling Interests Versus Independent Constitutional
Principles
Apart from U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, and arguably
Powell v. McCormack, the case law examined above treats
Legitimate-Selection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking as govern-
mental interests—generally “compelling” governmental interests
—sufficient to justify governmental regulation, but not as compo-
nents of a stand-alone constitutional principle. Although useful, that
case law does not go far enough because there are four critical
differences between a compelling governmental interest and a full-
fledged constitutional principle. I sketch these four differences
below and fully develop them later in Part III.
First, whereas a compelling governmental interest is a defense for
government regulation challenged as infringing a constitutional
commitment protected by strict scrutiny, independent constitutional
principles also can operate as a sword to challenge governmental
217. Id. at 2259 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
218. Id. at 2255, 2263 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) and
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), respectively) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. at 2263-64.
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action. For instance, a compelling governmental interest could not
have been used to invalidate Indiana’s voter identification law in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, whereas a constitu-
tional principle could have.220
Second, a constitutional interest may motivate legislatures
differently than would a compelling governmental interest.
Legislators may act more responsibly if they believe their participa-
tion is necessary to fully realize a constitutional commitment than
if they are told that there is a “compelling governmental interest”
that they act in a particular way.221 After all, compelling governmen-
tal interests are “mere” policies, whereas constitutional commit-
ments are something more.222
Third, the failure to recognize a full-fledged constitutional prin-
ciple distorts analysis when that principle runs up against a
competing constitutional commitment.223 In such a circumstance,
the failure to recognize the constitutional consideration, treating it
instead as “merely” a compelling governmental interest, can erro-
neously oversimplify the situation, making it appear that only a
single constitutional value is at stake. The overlooked constitutional
principle might not be given the dignity it deserves when a legisla-
ture considers whether to legislate or a court reviews legislation. 
Fourth, recognizing that Legitimate-Selection and Legitimate-
Decisionmaking implicate constitutional interests, and not merely
compelling governmental interests, makes clear that there are
situations that present conflicts of competing constitutional com-
mitments.224 This should have doctrinal consequences for courts.
The understanding that a legislature’s decision reflects a considered
effort to harmonize competing constitutional commitments, rather
than a decision that implicates only a single constitutional principle,
should generally lead to greater judicial deference to the legislative
judgment because legislatures are better suited than courts, on
grounds of both institutional competency and democratic legitimacy,
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801 (1997) (showing the seriousness with which Congress approached the
interpretation and implementation of the Constitution).
222. See Rosen, supra note 17.
223. See infra Part III.C.2.
224. See infra Part III.C.2.
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to reconcile competing incommensurable constitutional commit-
ments.225
For all these reasons, there is a meaningful difference between a
compelling governmental interest and an independent constitut-
ional principle. 
2. The Distinction Between Individual Constitutional Rights
and Structural Constitutional Principles
This Article’s claim is that Republican Legitimacy is a structural
constitutional principle consisting of the conditions necessary to
ensure that both our constitutionally created federal government
and those of the states are functional and stable republican gov-
ernments. With the exception of the Thornton and Powell decisions,
however, the cases have addressed aspects of Republican Legitimacy
in the course of analyzing individual rights-based claims based on
the Equal Protection and Free Speech Clauses. This is a second
respect in which most of the case law has not given Republican
Legitimacy its full due; the minimal conditions necessary for
Legitimate-Selection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking are facets of
constitutional structure, not aspects of individual rights.
But does it really matter whether a constitutional principle is
deemed to be individual rights-based or structural? A longstanding
scholarly debate addresses this very question. On the one side,
Professors Richard H. Pildes, Samuel Issacharoff, and Pam Karlan
argue that many election law questions implicate structural con-
stitutional principles, and that attempting to address structural
constitutional harms by rights-based constitutional doctrines is
problematic.226 On the other side, Professor Richard Hasen denies
the existence of structural constitutional principles in the election
225. See infra Part III.C.2.
226. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 40 (2004) (“Under-
standings of rights or equality worked out in other domains of constitutional law often badly
fit the sphere of democratic politics; indeed, the unreflective analogical transfer of rights and
equality frameworks from other domains can seriously damage and distort the processes of
politics.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644-45 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan,
Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush
v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001); Pildes, supra, at 41-55.
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law context.227 Professor Guy Charles splits the baby, arguing that
“it is immaterial whether one casts political rights claims in a
structuralist or individualist frame.”228
This Article falls squarely on, and builds upon, the Pildes,
Issacharoff, and Karlan side of the debate. It does so in two ways,
both critically and constructively. First, in the subsection immedi-
ately below, I critically analyze Professor Hasen’s and Professor
Charles’s arguments against structural constitutional principles.
The constructive support of structuralism appears after that, in
Part III, in which I identify reasons why constitutional rights
cannot be counted on to adequately protect structural constitutional
principles229 and show fallout from the Court’s failure to treat
Republican Legitimacy as a structural principle. 
a. Critiquing Professor Hasen’s Wholesale Rejection of  
Structural Principles in the Electoral Context
Professor Hasen, among the nation’s leading election law schol-
ars, argues that “structural theories are all about individual and
group rights after all.”230 He “see[s] nothing normatively improper
(much less constitutionally intolerable) about a practice that causes
no harm to individuals or groups of individuals.”231
The effort to collapse structural concerns into individual and
group rights is mistaken for several reasons. First, it is inconsistent
with constitutional text. Some constitutional provisions are prima-
rily directed to securing the interests of individuals, whereas others
are directed to constituting or securing governmental institutions.
It is no surprise that the Fourteenth Amendment’s charges that
states shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
227. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 138-56 (2003). 
228. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1131 (2005)
(reviewing HASEN, supra note 227). 
229. First, individual rights doctrines primarily focus their attention on individuals and
therefore can lead courts to overlook structural harms; it is easy to overlook considerations
that doctrine does not indicate are legally significant. See infra Part III.A.1. Second,
subdoctrines developed in—and sensible in—the context of individual rights may have
unintended consequences if applied to structural constitutional values. See infra Part III.A.2.
230. HASEN, supra note 227, at 156.
231. Id. at 152.
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without due process of law, nor deny to any person ... the equal
protection of the laws”232 have been primarily conceptualized as
generating individual rights despite the fact that due process and
equal protection have downstream consequences as to how gov-
ernmental institutions operate. Conversely, the requirement that
the President “give to the Congress Information of the State of
the Union,”233 and those of the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses,234 are best understood as structural requirements that
determine the character of governmental institutions, though they
also have downstream effects on individuals.235
Second, Hasen’s effort to collapse the distinction between
structure and individual rights is troublesome because individual
rights and structural interests are conceptually distinct. In one
direction, individual rights can be violated even if a governmental
institution cannot be improved upon. For example, a rogue or absent
minded police officer may wrongfully search a citizen’s home despite
the fact that a fully adequate governmental policy is in place. In
other words, even if there is nothing structurally wrong with a
governmental institution or policy, individual rights can be harmed.
In the other direction, there can be structural damage even if a
governmental action imposes no harm to an individual. Consider,
for example, a hypothetical statute giving Congress the power to
approve the ambassadors proposed by the President. Because the
Constitution grants the President the power to appoint ambassadors
with the advice and consent of the Senate,236 such a statute would
enlarge the House of Representatives’ power vis-à-vis ambassadors
and, correspondingly, diminish the powers of the Senate and the
President. This would impose a structural harm to the governmen-
tal system established by the Constitution despite the fact that it
would not seem to harm individual citizens.237
232. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
233. Id. art. II, § 3.
234. See id. art. I, § 1; id. § 7, cl. 2-3.
235. For example, the State of the Union informs citizens, and the bicameralism and
presentment requirements determine what creates federal law that is binding on citizens.
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
237. The conclusion would be no different if one were to instead characterize the statute
as harming every United States citizen’s right to have an ambassador chosen by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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To generalize, much of what the Constitution does is to establish
governmental entities and determine the relationships among them.
There is no reason to think that there cannot be constitutional
harms to these inanimate governmental structures. And, indeed,
the Supreme Court has long policed against improper incursions
against these institutions by means of the structural constitutional
principles known as separation of powers and federalism.
Professor Hasen probably does not deny the existence of struc-
tural principles in general but thinks that election law should only
be analyzed under the rubric of equality, not structure.238 Even this
more moderate position is untenable, however, because it is not the
case that all constitutional concerns in the voting context boil down
to equality.239 Republican Legitimacy, for instance, concerns what
is necessary to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the republi-
can forms of government that the Constitution creates and guaran-
tees; these interests are not reducible to “equality.” It does not slight
the Equal Protection Clause to recognize that democracy’s rules of
the road implicate other constitutional principles as well. 
At least part of what drives Professor Hasen is the hope of having
“apples-to-apples comparisons” among constitutional principles.240
But an attempt to reduce everything to equal protection is misbegot-
ten if, as this Article’s analysis suggests, multiple constitutional
principles are implicated in the rules-of-the-road context.241 Analysis
unavoidably becomes complex when multiple incommensurable
constitutional principles point to different outcomes. The attempt to
reduce distinctive, incommensurable constitutional commitments
into a single constitutional currency purchases resolvability only at
the cost of distortion. 
As further evidence that a meaningful distinction between
individual rights and structural constitutional interests exists, this
distinction already is embedded in much constitutional doctrine.242
238. See HASEN, supra note 227, at 153-56.
239. Professor Hasen summarizes his book as an argument that courts’ sole role is to be
the “actor[ ] of last resort who must referee some high-stakes political battles and protect
basic rights of political equality” and closes his book with a chapter entitled “Equality, Not
Structure.” Id. at 138.
240. Id. at 156.
241. These include, specifically, Republican Legitimacy, as well as individual rights
principles such as free speech and equal protection.
242. This argument is a species of the inductive reasoning that undergirds common law
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For example, the distinction between individual rights and struc-
tural interests helps explain why some constitutional matters can
be waived and others cannot.243 It is the individual, personal nature
of the right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment
right against unlawful search and seizure that makes these con-
stitutional matters waivable by individuals. Conversely, as the
Supreme Court has explained, federalism’s constitutional require-
ments may not be waived by states because they are structural.244
Likewise, parties to litigation cannot waive Article III’s “structural”
protections,245 which guard the “role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.”246
Similarly, it is unthinkable that the President or Congress could
waive presentment. To generalize, individuals cannot waive struc-
tural constitutional requirements because such matters are not
“theirs” to waive on account of their structural character. Permitting
waiver of structural values would put such interests at risk. 
Professor Hasen also argues that structuralism reflects “judicial
hubris” and that courts should not “make deeply contested norma-
tive judgments about the appropriate functioning of the political
process” that structuralism entails.247 This argument fails because
“[s]tructuralism is not necessarily juriscentric.”248 The question of
whether a structural principle exists is wholly distinct from the
question of which institution, the courts or the legislatures, is pri-
marily, or exclusively, responsible for implementing it.249 Indeed,
several structural constitutional principles are exclusively or prima-
reasoning insofar as it draws a general principle from decisions that were rendered in specific
contexts. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23
(1921) (“The common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and
inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively [but i]ts method is inductive,
and it draws its generalizations from particulars.”).
243. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“[L]itigants may waive
their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial. The most basic rights
of criminal defendants are similarly subject to waivers.” (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted)). See generally Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801 (2003).
244. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83 (1992).
245. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986).
246. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
247. HASEN, supra note 227, at 153.
248. Charles, supra note 228, at 1113.
249. For example, constitutional principles that are nonjusticiable political questions exist
and are implemented by nonjudicial institutions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
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rily the responsibility of Congress; for instance, the Constitution’s
guarantee that states are to have republican forms of government
falls to Congress under current doctrine,250 as does the Tenth
Amendment’s federalism limitations on Congress’s legislative
powers.251 Similarly, primary responsibility for implementing
Republican Legitimacy falls to the legislative branch.252
b. Critiquing Professor Charles’s Claim that the Distinction
Between Rights and Structure Is Immaterial
Let us next consider Professor Charles’s claim that “it is immate-
rial whether one casts political rights claims in a structuralist or
individualist frame.”253 Charles provides two justifications for his
conclusion.
First, Charles argues that “whenever the Court uses rights-speak,
the Court is doing so instrumentally to mask and rectify structural
concerns.”254 Unlike rights claims that are grounded in equal
protection or free speech, structural claims do not have any clear
textual basis and for that reason, says Charles, have an air of
illegitimacy. Treating structural principles as rights claims “pro-
vides the patina of constitutional legitimacy—the assurance (or
illusion) that courts are not simply fashioning doctrine out of whole
cloth without regard to the constitutional text.”255
I think there is something self-evidently unsatisfying with
Charles’s claim that rights claims are a ploy to give textual
grounding to judicial decisions. But beyond unsavory duplicity, it is
unnecessary. Some structural principles are reasonably inferred
from constitutional text.256 Moreover, structural inferences are a
250. See id. at 218.
251. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
252. See Rosen, supra note 17.
253. Charles, supra note 228, at 1131.
254. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. For the classic argument, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-32 (1969). For a more recent articulation, see Amar, supra note
142, at 28-30 (“For example, the phrases ‘separation of powers’ and ‘checks and balances’
appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these organizing concepts are part of the document,
read holistically. Each of the three great departments—legislative, executive, judicial—is
given its own separate article, introduced by a separate vesting clause. To read these three
vesting clauses as an ensemble (as their conspicuously parallel language and parallel
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well-accepted mode of constitutional interpretation, as is demon-
strated by the well-accepted doctrines of separation of powers and
federalism—both of which are structural principles that are derived
by inference, not from explicit constitutional text.257
Charles’s second argument is that “structural claims in law and
politics, which generally stem from democratic theory, are often
amorphous esoteric ideals that are difficult to domesticate for
adjudicative purposes.”258 Individual rights claims remedy this
difficulty, Charles asserts, because “[a]n individual rights frame-
work is how courts translate structural values into adjudicatory
claims capable of resolution by jurists as opposed to philosophers or
policymakers.... An individual rights framework also helps courts
think more concretely about structural problems and may direct
them toward judicially manageable remedies.”259
There are several problems with this argument. First, the claim
that “[a]n individual rights framework ... helps courts think more
concretely about structural problems” confuses the benefits of case-
by-case adjudication with individual rights.260 It is case-by-case
adjudication, not individual rights, that has allowed courts to
concretely express what various individual rights require. For
example, the contents of and values behind the individual rights of
free speech and equal protection were initially amorphous and
esoteric because they were difficult to explain,261 and were only
made concrete over time by the Court’s case-by-case, common law
reasoning. Similarly, courts have given concrete expression to
structural values, such as separation of powers, through case-by-
case adjudication.262
Second, Charles’s argument fails to explain how the use of
individual rights “translate[s] structural values” into claims that
placement would seem to invite) is to see a plain statement of separated powers.”).
257. See Amar, supra note 142, at 30.
258. Charles, supra note 228, at 1126.
259. Id. at 1128.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960) (“The meaning of no other clause of the Bill of Rights
at the time of its framing and ratification has been so obscure to us as the Free Speech and
Press Clause.”).
262. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
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vindicate those structural values.263 Professor Pildes has strenu-
ously argued that it is impossible to protect structural values if one
begins reasoning from individual rights,264 and Charles’s argument
does not respond to this. Part III provides several concrete examples
of Pildes’s general claim as it demonstrates three reasons why
individual rights cannot be relied upon to protect structural consti-
tutional values.265
III. REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY’S EXPLANATORY POWER: REVISITING
THREE SUPREME COURT CASES
Republican Legitimacy reworks the analysis of many controver-
sies concerning representative democracy’s rules of the road. This
Part applies Republican Legitimacy to (1) the voter identification
law that was challenged in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, (2) partisan gerrymandering, which was declared a nonjust-
iciable political question in Vieth v. Jubelirer, and (3) the campaign
finance regulation struck down in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission. My analysis of Crawford and Vieth demon-
strates two reasons why it is crucial to understand Republican
Legitimacy as a structural constitutional principle, rather than
assimilating it into an individual constitutional right: (a) individual
rights doctrines focus attention primarily on individuals, and in so
doing can lead courts to overlook structural harms, and (b) subdoc-
trines developed in the context of individual rights may have
unintended consequences if applied to structural constitutional
values. The analysis of Citizens United shows why Republican
Legitimacy is superior to anti-corruption as a conceptual and doc-
trinal framework, and demonstrates the significance of recognizing
Republican Legitimacy as a stand-alone constitutional principle. 
263. Charles, supra note 228, at 1128.
264. See Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights Oriented Democracy, 3
ELECTION L.J. 685, 687 (2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003)) (“The content of political rights in these cases necessarily derives from
a judgment about the proper structural aims to attribute to democracy.”).
265. For a brief overview of these reasons, and cross-references to where the arguments are
made, see supra note 229.
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A. Crawford and Voter Identification
Republican Legitimacy alters analysis of the voter identification
law challenged in Crawford in two fundamental respects. First, by
focusing attention on the representative system and not just
individuals, Republican Legitimacy shows that the plurality opin-
ions overlooked many legally relevant facts. Second, Republican
Legitimacy explains why two doctrines invoked by the plurality
opinions that blocked meaningful judicial review of Indiana’s
statute—the doctrines of facial challenges and discriminatory
intent—had no proper application in the case. 
1. Overlooked Facts
In 2005, Indiana enacted “one of the [nation’s] most restrictive”
voter identification laws266 on a straight party-line vote; it was
supported by all Republicans in the state legislature and received
no support from Democrats.267 The law required voters to present
government-issued identification at the polls.268 Nearly 1 percent of
Indiana’s population lacked such identification when the statute
passed,269 most of whom were poor or older voters.270
The Supreme Court in Crawford upheld a lower court’s dismissal
of a challenge to the Indiana statute on a rationale that makes it
very difficult to challenge voter identification laws before elections
already have taken place.271 The six votes upholding the dismissal
came in two plurality opinions, one by Justice Stevens, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, the other by Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.272 But the only harm both
opinions considered was whether the statute violated the “right to
vote” under equal protection.273 Neither the plurality nor the
266. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 222 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 240 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana’s law was the most
restrictive in the country).
267. See id. at 203 & n.21 (providing vote tally).
268. See id. at 185 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
269. See id. at 187-88 & n.6.
270. See id. at 238 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271. See id. at 187-89 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
272. See id. at 185; id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).
273. See id. at 198-200 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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dissenting opinions considered whether the statute threatened a
structural constitutional harm. 
More specifically, no Justice asked whether the Indiana statute,
and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, posed a threat to
Legitimate-Selection. If that question had been asked, it would have
been obvious that numerous facts in the case mentioned in passing
were of crucial legal significance. Consider the following: A conser-
vative estimate was that more than forty thousand Indiana voters,
about 1 percent of the state’s electorate, lacked the requisite
identification at the time the statute was enacted,274 and most of
these persons tended to vote Democratic.275 Indiana was known to
be a swing state in national elections, and it was well understood
that only a few hundred voters in another swing state determined
the nation’s President only five years earlier.276 The Indiana law
combated voter fraud in a highly partisan way: the statute targeted
a form of fraud in in-person voting—thought to favor Democrats—
and left unaddressed a form of fraud in absentee-voting—thought
to favor Republicans—despite the fact that the only fraud that had
been documented in Indiana was in absentee voting.277 Finally, all
Republicans in both houses of the Indiana legislature supported the
law, and all Democrats opposed it.278 Indeed, Justice Stevens’s
plurality opinion, which rejected the lawsuit, went so far as to
observe that “[i]t is fair to infer that partisan considerations may
have played a significant role in the decision to enact” Indiana’s
law.279 The three dissenting Justices agreed.280
None of the above-mentioned facts evidencing partisanship,
however, was legally relevant under Justices Stevens’s and Scalia’s
opinions. This is not surprising. Legal tests are reductive, identify-
ing as legally relevant only a small subset of the infinite facts that
characterizes a given circumstance. The above-mentioned facts bear
274. See id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 188 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
276. I refer, of course, to Florida in the 2000 presidential election.
277. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 225-26 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
278. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
279. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
280. See id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “[w]ithout a shred of evidence that
in-person voter impersonation [was] a problem in the State, much less a crisis,” Indiana had
enacted “one of the most restrictive photo identification requirements in the country”).
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on the question of whether there has been a structural harm to
republican government, but do not readily fit into equal protection
doctrine, which focuses instead on harm to individual voters. Thus,
Justice Stevens’s analysis was directed almost exclusively at
considering the “voters who may experience a special burden under
the statute,”281 ultimately rejecting petitioner’s challenge because
the record did not show “excessively burdensome requirements on
any class of voters.”282 Likewise, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
focused exclusively on the law’s effects on voters.283
But from the vantage point of the structural principle of
Republican Legitimacy, the above facts evidencing partisanship
were crucially relevant. A known byproduct of stricter registration
requirements is that fewer people to whom the requirements apply
will vote. Republicans thought that the law’s additional require-
ments would discourage more Democrat-voting than Republican-
voting voters from voting.284 And so did Democrats.285 A purposeful
partisan-skewed reduction of the electorate violates Legitimate-
Selection, the first component of Republican Legitimacy. That
Indiana’s voter identification law also aimed to accomplish a
legitimate antifraud goal should not provide cover for a legislature
to differentially limit the electorate.286
281. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
282. Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts evidencing partisanship
conceivably could have been relevant to the requirement that the Indiana law be
“nondiscriminatory” under Justice Stevens’s equal protection analysis. See id. at 204. But
Justice Stevens did not think the aforementioned partisanship facts relevant to the
nondiscrimination inquiry, most likely because he used “discriminatory” in the oddly narrow
sense of meaning an “irrelevant” voting requirement. See id. at 189 (concluding that the poll
taxes struck down in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1996), “invidiously
discriminate[d]” because the taxes were “irrelevant to the voter’s qualifications”). There is one
other place in Justice Stevens’s plurality where the above-mentioned facts conceivably could
have been relevant. See infra note 286.
283. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205-09 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing what criteria
determine “the severity of the burden” that a law imposes on voters).
284. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans,
J., dissenting) (“Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-
thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew
Democratic.”).
285. This is presumptively why the law was passed purely along party lines. See Crawford,
553 U.S. at 203 n.21 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
286. Justice Stevens suggests Indiana’s law would have been unconstitutional if “partisan
considerations ... had provided the only justification” for it. Id. at 203 (emphasis added). This
is too cramped an understanding of the appropriate constitutional limitations. In Justice
432 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:371
To conclude, exclusive reliance on individual rights doctrines led
the parties and the Court to overlook the legal significance of many
facts concerning the legitimacy of Indiana’s electoral system. And
this allows us to generalize an additional reason why Professor
Charles is mistaken in claiming it does not matter whether a
constitutional interest is denominated as individual or structural287:
because (1) legal rules are reductive by nature; (2) individual rights
doctrines focus attention on individuals, not structure; and (3)
individual rights claims may allow structural harms to be over-
looked. 
2. Inapplicable Subdoctrines
Each plurality opinion in Crawford invoked a legal subdoctrine
that prevented it from applying heightened review. Republican
Legitimacy makes clear why neither subdoctrine properly shielded
Indiana’s law from careful scrutiny. Both subdoctrines properly
apply to rights-based claims but are inapposite to the structural
principle of Republican Legitimacy. 
a. The Overlooked As-Applied Challenge 
Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion assumed that the petitioners
bore “a heavy burden of persuasion” because they advanced a facial
challenge.288 The Court has explicitly stated that “[f]acial challenges
are disfavored,”289 and it has deliberately designed the doctrine so
that facial challenges are much more difficult to win than as-applied
challenges. Facial challenges will prevail only if a “law is unconsti-
tutional in all of its applications,” and “a facial challenge must fail
where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”290
Stevens’s view, all voter identification laws would pass muster under a facial challenge
because all aim to accomplish at least one legitimate goal: combating voter fraud. This
shortchanges Legitimate-Selection due to the reasons provided above in the text. That there
are legitimate policies behind a genus of election laws should not mean that all possible
species of the election law are constitutional. I explain in a companion article what the Court
should have done in Crawford. See Rosen, supra note 17, at 46.
287. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
288. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
289. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). 
290. Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Stevens was surely correct that petitioners’ equal pro-
tection claims were facial challenges. After all, the election had not
yet occurred, and so no Indiana voters had yet been kept from
voting. “[C]onsider[ing] only the statute’s broad application to all
Indiana voters,” Justice Stevens quickly concluded that the State’s
interests in countering fraud were “sufficient to defeat petitioners’
facial challenge.”291
But exclusive focus on a rights claim led the Court and the parties
to overlook the as-applied challenge that was also present. Though
an individual may not be harmed until she has been barred from
voting, a structural harm to the legitimacy of republican govern-
ment can arise before Election Day. Voter registration laws bear on
the structural principle of Legitimate-Selection, and such laws can
affect the political activities of people and organizations before
elections take place. Because laws that undermine Legitimate-
Selection can have effects before elections, as-applied Republican
Legitimacy challenges can be brought before Election Day. Laws
that allegedly seek to differentially disenfranchise on partisan
grounds undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process before
even a single elector has been wrongfully kept from voting, and for
that reason, can properly be subject to as-applied Republican
Legitimacy challenges prior to Election Day. 
This is important because, as explained above, facial chal-
lenges are far more difficult to win than as-applied challenges.292
Post-election lawsuits asserting as-applied rights claims are not
adequate to protect the structural interest of Republican Legitimacy
because judicial remedies are limited. For example, courts have only
limited institutional capital to cast aside election results and order
new elections.293 Further, because legislatures make frequent
modifications to their election laws, allowing only as-applied rights
claims effectively insulates these laws from serious judicial review. 
We now are in a position to appreciate another reason why
Professor Charles is mistaken in arguing that it is irrelevant
whether constitutional interests are denominated as individual or
291. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202-03 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
292. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
293. Cf. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 967 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that the
“drastic remedy” of setting aside elections is “quite rare”).
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structural294: rights-based claims can trigger subdoctrines that are
not applicable to structural claims. The next subsection gives a
second example of this.
b. The Irrelevance of Discriminatory Intent
Republican Legitimacy explains why the doctrinal obstacle to
strict judicial review identified in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
—the absence of a showing of intentional discrimination by the
Indiana legislature—should not have barred the Court from sub-
jecting Indiana’s statute to heightened scrutiny. 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, which Justices Thomas and
Alito joined, cited to Washington v. Davis295 and asserted that
petitioners’ claim failed because they could not show that the
Indiana legislature had a discriminatory intent:
[W]eighing the burden of a nondiscriminatory voting law upon
each voter and concomitantly requiring exceptions for vulnerable
voters would effectively turn back decades of equal-protection
jurisprudence. A voter complaining about such a law’s effect on
him has no valid equal-protection claim because, without proof
of discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with dis-
parate impact is not unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when
their burdens purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected
class. A fortiori it does not do so when, as here, the classes
complaining of disparate impact are not even protected.296
A discriminatory intent may be sensible vis-à-vis individual
rights,297 but it has no place vis-à-vis structural constitutional
principles. An equal protection doctrine without a discriminatory
294. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
295. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
296. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
297. For present purposes I need not, and do not, take a position on the question of whether
intent requirements are ever desirable. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in
Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1149-50 (1989) (concluding that intent doctrine is a
misnomer, and that it actually operates so as to allow judges to surreptitiously balance
competing interests). For present purposes it suffices to show, as I try above in the text, that
structural constitutional principles are meaningfully different from individual rights vis-à-vis
intent.
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impact requirement may subject too many legitimate laws to height-
ened scrutiny, thereby striking down too many laws, as a result of
what might be called “judicial myopia.” There are political losers in
virtually every legislative battle, and this fact of politics ordinarily
is not constitutionally problematic. Without a discriminatory intent
requirement, such “nonproblematic” political losers can get courts
to focus on their loss without giving adequate attention to the
statute’s overall benefits which, as almost always occurs in politics,
comes at the expense of someone. Further, the legislation would be
subjected to a heightened scrutiny that seldom can be satisfied
when “mere politics” is the real reason for their loss. A discrimina-
tory intent requirement is a plausible doctrinal mechanism for
correcting such judicial myopia.
Critically, the risk of judicial myopia does not extend to structural
constitutional principles. If a statute imposes a structural constitu-
tional harm, then such harm is a sufficient and legitimate basis for
triggering heightened judicial review because there is no larger
context that could conceivably justify the legislation. Accordingly, a
structural harm appropriately triggers heightened judicial scrutiny.
And this explains why structural constitutional principles do not
contain discriminatory intent requirements. For instance, separa-
tion of powers doctrine considers the aggregate effects of a statute
on, say, the President’s powers, never inquiring whether Congress
intended to encroach on presidential power.298 This is true of both
so-called formalist and functionalist separation of powers doc-
trines.299 The Court’s federalism jurisprudence likewise did not in-
clude an intentionality requirement in the days when it judicially
enforced the Tenth Amendment.300 Nor is there any such inten-
tionality requirement under the Court’s quasi-Tenth Amendment
anticommandeering jurisprudence.301
298. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (noting that the legal test is
whether allowing a lawsuit against a sitting president “will curtail the scope of the official
powers of the Executive Branch” without a discriminatory intent requirement).
299. Clinton v. Jones adopted a “functionalist” approach. For an example of a “formalist”
approach, which likewise did not include a discriminatory intent requirement, see Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
300. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-48 (1976).
301. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992).
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That discriminatory intent has no proper application to struc-
tural constitutional principles is yet another reason why individual
rights doctrines cannot adequately guard structural values.302
Discriminatory intent is exceedingly difficult to establish. Beyond
the “many minds” puzzle of which legislators’ intent should matter
for purposes of establishing discriminatory intent, legislators tend
to have multiple motivations when they vote, and nowadays are suf-
ficiently sophisticated to avoid publicly revealing nefarious intents.
Moreover, state legislatures—the institutions that create most of
the rules of the road—typically do not publish formal legislative
histories that reveal any legislative intent. For all these reasons,
discriminatory intent is hard to show, and doctrines that require it
risk underenforcing the constitutional principle they implement.303
As applied to the Indiana law, the upshot is the following:
showing that the Indiana legislature discriminatorily intended to
undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process was not a prere-
quisite of heightened scrutiny.304 Reliance on individual rights left
the structural constitutional interest vulnerable because discrim-
inatory requirements, which are very difficult to satisfy, are not
applicable to structural constitutional claims.
B. Vieth and Partisan Gerrymandering
Five Justices dismissed a partisan gerrymandering claim as
nonjusticiable in Vieth v. Jubelirer.305 Joined by three other Justices,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion decided that all partisan gerry-
mandering claims were nonjusticiable political questions because
there was no judicially manageable standard.306 In his view, “the
mere fact that the[ ] four dissenters come up with three different
standards—all of them different from the two proposed in [the
earlier case of] Bandemer and the one proposed here by appel-
lants—goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitution-
302. Pace Professor Charles, once again. See supra Part II.C.2.
303. See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-128 (2004).
304. A companion article considers precisely what scrutiny should have been applied to
Indiana’s law and other Republican Legitimacy claims. See Rosen, supra note 17.
305. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
306. Id. at 281 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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ally discernible standard.”307 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which
provided the crucial fifth vote, dismissed the claim but did not
categorically shut the door on partisan gerrymandering claims.308
Republican Legitimacy sheds important light on Vieth in two
respects. First, it provides a conceptual framework that facilitates
identification of overlooked common ground between Justice
Kennedy and the four dissenters. The conceptual and doctrinal
clarity provided by Republican Legitimacy conceivably could have
led to a different outcome in Vieth: a five Justice opinion permitting
Republican Legitimacy claims against partisan gerrymanders.309
Second, awareness of Republican Legitimacy facilitates recogni-
tion of the inadequacies of the individual rights-based approach
taken in Vieth. The multiple proposed legal tests do not mean there
are no “discernible standards” to govern partisan gerrymandering
claims as Justice Scalia asserted, but reflect the folly of shoehorning
challenges to partisan gerrymandering into an individual rights
claim instead of placing them into the structural constitutional
claim in which they properly fit. Republican Legitimacy hence
shows that Justice Scalia mistook a failure to agree on account of
conceptual confusion for the impossibility of agreement.
1. Overlooked Common Ground
The sole constitutional ground asserted by the petitioners before
the Supreme Court was that Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause.310 This exclusively individual
rights-focused approach distorted the way the Justices viewed the
case because it left the Justices without a doctrinal and conceptual
basis to ground the structural harms that five of the Justices had
noted. Consequently, some Justices merely made passing comments
about partisan gerrymandering’s structural harms, while others
attempted to shoehorn the structural harms, which in fact are
aspects of Republican Legitimacy, into individual rights doctrine.
307. Id. at 292.
308. See id. at 309-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
309. See supra note 304.
310. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“Only an equal protection
claim is before us in the present case.”). 
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Republican Legitimacy provides a coherent framework within which
these harms could have been housed. 
First, consider Justice Stevens’s dissent. He thought partisan
gerrymandering ran afoul of equal protection, but his conception
of the constitutional harm was structural, not rights-based:
Gerrymanders “effect a constitutional wrong when they disrupt the
representational norms that ordinarily tether elected officials to
their constituencies as a whole.”311 They generate a “disruption of
the representative process,” which imposes a “representational
har[m].”312 Justice Stevens is describing harms to both components
of Republican Legitimacy: gerrymanders distort Legitimate-
Selection and undermine Legitimate-Decisionmaking. 
To be sure, Justice Stevens labored to tie these structural harms
to individuals so as to fit them into equal protection doctrine.313 This
is conceptually misbegotten insofar as it focuses attention away
from the primary harm and instead onto its secondary conse-
quences. And doing this had significant doctrinal costs because, as
shown above, subdoctrines applicable to individual rights-based
doctrines frequently are irrelevant to structural principles.314 More
specifically, Justice Stevens’s individual rights analysis triggered an
equal protection subdoctrine that shielded the claim from height-
ened judicial review, as Justice Scalia convincingly showed.315 That
subdoctrine would have had no application, however, to a structural
constitutional claim grounded in Republican Legitimacy.316
Even more clearly than Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer’s dissent
conceptualized the harm of partisan gerrymandering structurally.
Unconstitutional gerrymandering occurs when the district plan
“fail[s] to advance any plausible democratic objective while simulta-
311. Id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. See id. at 321-24.
314. See supra Part III.A.2.
315. Justice Stevens analogized partisan gerrymandering to racial gerrymandering. See
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, the
level of scrutiny under equal protection turns on the identity of the harmed group, and while
race triggers heightened scrutiny, political affiliation does not. See id. at 293-94 (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion). 
316. The level of review appropriate to a structural claim does not turn on whether there
has been harm to individuals who fall into a suspect class for equal protection purposes. See
Rosen, supra note 17.
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neously threatening serious democratic harm.”317 Breyer found
“constitutionally mandated democratic requirements”318 to be
grounded in the Constitution’s opening words.319 The contents of
these constitutional “democratic requirements” are part of
Legitimate-Selection: prohibited is “the unjustified use of political
factors to entrench a minority in power.”320 Entrenchment is a
“democratic harm” where “democratic values are dishonored”
because “voters find it far more difficult to remove those responsible
for a government they do not want.”321
To be sure, Justice Breyer ultimately grounded the constitutional
harm of partisan gerrymandering in equal protection.322 This is
unsurprising in view of the fact that equal protection was the only
claim petitioners had asserted. But Breyer’s structural conception
of gerrymandering’s harm suggests he may have been amenable to
the principle of Republican Legitimacy.
Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence provided the critical fifth
vote for Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, plausibly could have
provided an additional vote for Republican Legitimacy. Justice
Kennedy criticized the appellants’ exclusive reliance on equal pro-
tection and suggested that an alternative constitutional princi-
ple—free speech—may have been more suitable to their challenge.323
Openness to an alternative to equal protection suggests that
Kennedy might have been open to other grounds as well. 
Further, Justice Kennedy wrote of gerrymandering’s impact on
“rights of fair and effective representation.”324 He also explicitly
framed his free speech challenge in structural terms, tying his
proposed legal test to the structural rationale that “[r]epresentative
democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable
without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among
317. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 356.
319. Id. (“We the People, who ordain[ed] and establish[ed] the American Constitution,
sought to create and to protect a workable form of government that is in its principles,
structure, and whole mass basically democratic.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
320. Id. at 360
321. Id. at 361; see also id. at 367 (referring to the “risk of harm to basic democratic
principle[s]”).
322. See id. at 355.
323. See id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 312.
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the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.”325
Finally, and most tellingly, Justice Kennedy closed his concurrence
as follows: “The ordered working of our Republic, and of the
democratic process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in
all branches of government .... Here, one has the sense that
legislative restraint was abandoned. That should not be thought to
serve the interests of our political order.”326 This is likely Justice
Kennedy’s view as to what was the most salient harm, and it is
structural in character: trauma to the conditions necessary to
sustain the “ordered working of our Republic,” the “democratic
process,” and “our political order.”327 Indeed, these are aspects of
Legitimate-Selection.
Justice Kennedy ultimately concurred because of the “failings of
the many proposed standards for measuring the burden a gerry-
mander imposes on representational rights,”328 but thought the
Court “should be prepared to order relief” if workable standards
emerge in the future.329 Would he have joined an opinion that asked
a lower court to take account of the structural harms that he himself
observed? The fairest answer, I would think, is an enthusiastic
“perhaps.” The answer quite likely turns on whether such a harm
could be protected by a judicially manageable legal standard. A
companion article argues that it can.330
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
made passing reference to gerrymandering’s structural conse-
quences, noting that “the increasing efficiency of partisan redis-
tricting has damaged the democratic process to a degree that our
predecessors only began to imagine.”331 The thrust of Justice
Souter’s opinion, however, was that gerrymandering harmed
individual voters.332 But this does not mean that Justices Souter and
325. Id. at 314 (quoting Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
326. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 317.
329. Id.
330. See Rosen, supra note 17.
331. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 343 (emphasizing that
gerrymandering interferes with the “right to fair and effective representation” (quoting Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-34 (1986) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
332. See id. at 343 (“The Constitution guarantees both formal and substantial equality
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Ginsburg would have been unwilling to join an opinion that
forthrightly understood partisan gerrymandering as also imposing
a structural constitutional harm. It does not seem farfetched to
suggest they may have joined an opinion signed by Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Kennedy that analyzed partisan gerrymandering under
the structural principle of Republican Legitimacy.
2. Mistaking a Failure to Agree for the Impossibility of     
Agreement
Republican Legitimacy facilitates recognition of a flaw in Justice
Scalia’s main argument. Justice Scalia wrote “the mere fact that
these four dissenters come up with three different standards ... goes
a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discern-
ible standard.”333 This is an unfair conclusion because although all
dissenters invoked the same terminology of “equal protection,” they
had fundamentally different understandings of partisan gerryman-
dering’s harm. Justices Stevens and Breyer conceptualized the harm
structurally, whereas Justices Souter and Ginsburg conceptualized
individual-based harms.334 The Justices’ different judicial standards
are a natural byproduct of their different conceptions of the consti-
tutional harm, but do not indicate that a single conception could not
be addressed by a manageable standard. It is possible that the
conceptual clarity afforded by Republican Legitimacy could have led
to agreement among the Justices. The Justices’ lack of conceptual
clarity in Vieth does not mean that agreement is impossible once
clarity is obtained, pace Justice Scalia. 
C. Revisiting Citizens United
Republican Legitimacy has important implications for Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, the controversial decision
that struck down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s
among voters.” (emphasis added)); id. (describing gerrymandering as denying “each political
group in a State ... the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political
group” (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion))).
333. Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
334. See id. at 317-23 (Justice Stevens’s approach); id. at 355-66 (Justice Breyer’s
approach); id. at 343-50 (Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s approach).
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(BCRA) prohibition on corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds to make independent expenditures for “election-
eering communication” or the express advocacy of the election or
defeat of a candidate.335 Republican Legitimacy illuminates Citizens
United in two respects. First, as Part III.C.1 explains, Republican
Legitimacy clarifies the nature and significance of the governmental
interest behind the expenditures prohibition, showing there was a
compelling governmental interest. Second, Republican Legitimacy
shows that deciding whether corporate and union expenditures
should be banned implicated a conflict between two competing con-
stitutional considerations: free speech and Republican Legitimacy.
Congress’s considered resolution of this constitutional conflict was
entitled to substantial judicial deference. 
1. Recognizing a Compelling Governmental Interest
First, Republican Legitimacy clarifies the governmental interest
behind the campaign finance regulation. This is doctrinally critical
because all Justices accepted that constitutionally protected speech
can be regulated when there is a compelling governmental interest
and the regulation is narrowly tailored.336 Among the core disputes
in the case was whether the provision in BCRA was supported by a
compelling governmental interest. 
The Justices believed that the crucial question was whether
BCRA’s ban was designed to prevent corruption, or the appearance
thereof, of the electoral process.337 “Corruption” assumed this central
role because the earlier case of Buckley v. Valeo held that prevent-
ing corruption or its appearance was “sufficiently important” to
justify campaign finance limits.338 Of course, the fact that corruption
was sufficiently important does not mean that only corruption is
sufficiently important to justify regulation. But instead of consider-
ing whether other sufficiently important governmental interests
were present, the lawyers defending BCRA and the Justices tried
to shoehorn all governmental interests into the one surefire suf-
335. 130 S. Ct. 876, 887, 913 (2010).
336. See id. at 898. 
337. See id. at 901-11 (explaining the governmental interest in the prevention of
corruption).
338. 424 U.S. 1, 25, 29 (1976) (per curiam).
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ficiently important interest: corruption. This was unfortunate
because, as I explain below, Republican Legitimacy is a far superior
framework for analyzing BCRA. 
a. The Justices’ Understandings of Corruption 
To recognize Republican Legitimacy’s superiority to corruption,
it is first necessary to understand how “corruption” operated in the
Citizens United opinion. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held
that corruption extended only to “quid pro quo corruption,” or the
direct exchange of “dollars for political favors.”339 The majority
concluded that “independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption,”340 and that BCRA’s ban accordingly did not satisfy strict
scrutiny. 
Justice Stevens’s dissent adopted a broader definition of corrup-
tion. Drawing on prior cases, Justice Stevens identified nearly a
half-dozen ways that union and corporate expenditures could lead
to corruption: unregulated expenditures could (1) give corporations
“unfai[r] influence in the electoral process”; (2) “distort public debate
in ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of
listeners ... [by] drowning out ... noncorporate voices”; (3) “generate
the impression that corporations dominate our democracy,” which
could lead citizens to “lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to
influence public policy,” to “cynicism and disenchantment,” and
ultimately to “a reduced willingness of voters to take part in demo-
cratic governance”; (4) possibly chill the speech of elected officials,
“who fear that a certain corporation can make or break their
reelection chances”; and (5) open the door to rent seeking that is “far
more destructive than what noncorporations are capable of” due to
corporations’ lower collective action costs vis-à-vis individuals.341
339. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-11 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. Id. at 909.
341. Id. at 974-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
quotations marks omitted).
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b. The Superiority of Republican Legitimacy 
Republican Legitimacy is a superior framework to anti-corruption
for four reasons. First, Republican Legitimacy provides a more
conceptually coherent framework that explains how the welter of
policies discussed in Justice Stevens’s dissent was all part of a
single, integrated principle. Second, Republican Legitimacy points
to other lines of case law that support the dissent’s position. Third,
the understanding that BCRA’s goal was to secure Republican
Legitimacy, rather than to address corruption, sheds a spotlight on
two extraordinary logical gaps in the majority’s reasoning. Finally,
Republican Legitimacy provides a principled basis for concluding
that the BCRA was supported by a compelling governmental
interest. 
i. Conceptual Clarity
First consider the many forms of corruption Justice Stevens
identified in his dissent. As presented in his opinion, they seem like
a disjointed laundry list. Indeed, it is not without cause that
Professor Hasen has written that, although Stevens’s analysis
contains “many provocative and important ideas,” it “as a whole ...
does not cohere.”342
Although Stevens’s arguments may not “cohere” under an anticor-
ruption rationale,343 this does not mean that they cannot cohere. The
coherence problem lies not with Stevens’s justifications, but with
the organizing rubric of anti-corruption. Republican Legitimacy, by
contrast, perfectly captures the potential harms Stevens identified.
The apparently disparate list of dangers fall into two categories that
by now should be familiar: threats to (1) Legitimate-Selection
(rationales 1-3) and (2) Legitimate-Decisionmaking (rationales 4-5). 
To see that Justice Stevens was speaking more about Republican
Legitimacy than corruption, consider his response to Justice
342. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 989, 999 (2011).
343. It is true that Professor Hasen argues that Justice Stevens’s explanations did not
amount to a coherent anti-distortion (rather than anti-corruption) rationale, but Justice
Stevens himself equated anti-corruption with anti-distortion. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 970-71.
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Kennedy’s argument that corruption extends only to quid pro quo
exchanges. Justice Stevens wrote that “[t]here are threats of
corruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society than
the odd bribe.”344 Stevens’s explanation is more naturally and com-
pellingly conceptualized as addressing the governmental interest in
guarding Republican Legitimacy. Stevens spoke of the danger that
“private interests are seen to exert outsized control over officehold-
ers solely on account of the money spent on (or withheld from) their
campaigns.”345 Officeholders must “‘decide issues ... on the merits or
the desires of their constituencies,’ ... not ‘according to the wishes of
those who have made large financial contributions’—or expendi-
tures—‘valued by the officeholder.’”346 Justice Stevens called this the
concern that some nonconstituents will have an “undue influence,”
or “improper influence[ ],” on officeholders’ decisionmaking.347
Furthermore, he wrote:
There should be nothing controversial about the proposition that
the influence being targeted is ‘undue.’ In a democracy, office-
holders should not make public decisions with the aim of
placating a financial benefactor, except to the extent that the
benefactor is seen as representative of a larger constituency or
its arguments are seen as especially persuasive.348
In short, though Justice Stevens used the terminology of “cor-
ruption,” he was actually drawing on a theory of what constitutes
illegitimate decisionmaking by elected representatives—that is,
what this Article calls Legitimate-Decisionmaking.349
Framing Justice Stevens’s argument as the claim that BCRA
aimed to secure Legitimate-Decisionmaking significantly strength-
ens the argument. In addition to revealing the conceptual unity
behind what at first appears to be disparate policies, Republican
344. Id. at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
345. Id.
346. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 880).
347. Id. at 962-63 & nn.63-65. 
348. Id. at 962 n.63.
349. Consider, as well, Justice Stevens’s executive summary of the BCRA’s goal: “[T]o
safeguard the integrity, competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the electoral
process.” Id. at 975. This is conceptually connected to Republican Legitimacy, not to anti-
corruption. 
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Legitimacy provides a principled reason to conclude that BCRA was
supported by a compelling governmental interest. BCRA targeted
what Congress believed to be improper influences on legislators’
decisionmaking: Congress thought corporate and union expend-
itures posed a particularly acute risk that legislators would support
policies for reasons of illegitimate self-interest. Because maintaining
Republican Legitimacy is a constitutional interest, governmental
policies that target threats to Republican Legitimacy satisfy the
compelling governmental interest test.350
Further, grounding Stevens’s argument in Republican Legitimacy
invokes the case law and theoretical considerations examined
earlier, which explain the need for, and contents of, Legitimate-
Decisionmaking.351 Government officials must act impartially in the
public interest, and “self-interested ways” by government officials352
can be unconstitutional without rising to the level of “corrupt.”
Consider in this regard the “conflict-of-interest recusal rule[s]” in
Congress and “virtually every State” that were canvassed, and
upheld, in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan.353 The criteria
for recusal—when a legislator “is immediately and particularly
interested” or a judge has “personal bias or prejudice”—are trig-
gered by circumstances that fall short of “corruption.”354 This is so
because the recusal criteria are not aimed at corruption, but at
maintaining the legitimacy and dignity of government.355
350. The analysis above does not mean that all expenditure restrictions would be
constitutional. Regulations still would have to satisfy the narrowly tailored standard,
meaning that restrictions that selectively disadvantaged a political party or ideology would
be unconstitutional. 
351. See supra Part I.B.2.
352. See VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 4.
353. 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-49 (2011). Though Carrigan was decided after Citizens United,
legislative antirecusal rules date back to a week after the First Congress convened. See id. at
2348. “[T]he long-recognized need for legislative recusal” is itself powerful evidence of the
need’s legitimacy. Id. at 2347-49. And as explained above in the text, the need for such recusal
rules is grounded in Legitimate-Decisionmaking.
354. Id. at 2347-48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
355. As noted above—but worth reiterating—the Senate’s recusal rules, adopted when
Thomas Jefferson was President of the Senate, explain that not having such rules would be
“so contrary not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social
compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own case.” Id. at 2348 (quoting MANUAL
OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, supra note 196, at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
rules continue by stating that “it is for the honor of the house that this rule, of immemorial
observance, should be strictly adhered to.” Id.
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In short, like the recusal rules at issue in Carrigan, BCRA was an
instance of the legislature policing itself. The Carrigan Court was
substantially deferential to legislative self-policing,356 even when it
trenched on legislators’ political advocacy; the Carrigan majority
upheld not only Nevada’s voting ban, but also rules that “forbid[ ]
[the legislator] to ‘advocate the passage or failure’ of the pro-
posal—evidently meaning advocating its passage or failure during
the legislative debate.”357 The Citizens United Court likewise should
have been more deferential to Congress’s self-policing in BCRA. 
ii. Gaps in the Majority’s Logic
Republican Legitimacy sheds light on a logical flaw in Justice
Kennedy’s decision for the majority. Consider Justice Kennedy’s
argument as to why preventing quid pro quo exchanges of “dollars
for political favors” is the only anti-corruption interest that consti-
tutes a compelling governmental interest.358 Kennedy stated that
even though corporate and union expenditures may be intended by
their donors to secure influence over legislators, “[f]avoritism and
influence are not ... avoidable in representative politics.”359 Not only
can they not be avoided, but they are desirable in Kennedy’s view:
It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood
that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason,
to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate
over another is that the candidate will respond by producing
356. To be sure, under the Carrigan majority’s analysis, the Court was not being
deferential to legislative self-policing because the recusal rules did not affect constitutionally
protected speech. I criticized this reasoning, and explained above why the recusal statutes
indeed regulated constitutionally protected speech, but did so in a permissible fashion. See
supra note 199. 
357. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347.
358. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-10 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
359. Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is
premised on responsiveness.360
In short, “favoritism and influence” are the other side of the coin of
representatives’ responsiveness to constituents’ preferences—and
responsiveness is a normative good in a representative democracy.
When examined through the lens of anti-corruption, Justice
Kennedy’s position may seem plausible. After all, one could argue
the activities listed in Justice Stevens’s dissent do not really
constitute corruption. It may not be corrupt for corporations to aim
to influence who gets elected and how their representatives vote, or
that corporations can spend more money than individuals to
influence elections. It may not be corrupt for a legislator to be
influenced by the donations of his contributors. Given the amor-
phousness of corruption, and its usual requirement of bad intent,361
there is plausibility to Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that these
phenomena do not constitute “corruption.” 
Justice Kennedy’s argument looks very different, however,
through the lens of Republican Legitimacy. As explained above,
Justice Stevens’s position is best understood as the claim that
BCRA guarded Legitimate-Decisionmaking.362 Thusly understood,
Justice Kennedy’s argument was a non sequitur363: Justice
Kennedy’s truism—that an officeholder invariably favors one policy
(and hence voter preference) over another policy (and voter
preference)—is irrelevant to whether a class of illegitimate legisla-
tive motivations exists. Similarly, that representatives should be
responsive to their constituents’ preferences does not mean that
there does not exist a category of “illegitimate” or “undue” constitu-
ent influence, as Justice Stevens claimed.364 For these reasons,
Justice Kennedy’s position does not respond at all to the best
understanding of Justice Stevens’s argument.
360. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted).
361. See Teachout, supra note 10, at 382 (arguing that bad intent is the “centerpiece” of
political corruption).
362. See supra Part III.C.1.b.i.
363. Although the idea of illegitimate legislative motivations may be missed under a
“corruption” rubric, this idea stands front and center of Republican Legitimacy’s concern with
Legitimate-Decisionmaking.
364. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
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2. Recognizing a Constitutional Conflict 
Republican Legitimacy could have had another important impli-
cation for BCRA. Republican Legitimacy makes clear that BCRA
implicated two competing constitutional principles: speech and
Republican Legitimacy.365 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the maj-
ority did not analyze BCRA this way: it viewed BCRA as an inex-
plicable disregard of one constitutional commitment—speech366
—not as a resolution of a difficult constitutional conflict. Of course,
Congress had not actually realized this, as it had not recognized
Republican Legitimacy to be a constitutional principle. But if
Congress had—if BCRA was the considered judgment of Congress
and the President as to how competing constitutional principles
should be harmonized—then their judgment should have received
significant judicial deference.367
365. While BCRA admittedly limited speech, it also advanced Republican Legitimacy.
Striking the ban arguably came at the expense of the constitutional value of Republican
Legitimacy. 
366. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech must prevail
against laws that would suppress it.”). Though Justice Stevens at one point referred to the
necessity of “balanc[ing] competing constitutional concerns,” he was referring to the
competing First Amendment interests of the speakers—corporations and unions—and the
public, not to conflicts among distinct constitutional principles. See id. at 969 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
367. Courts and scholars have given surprisingly little attention to conflicts between
constitutional principles. Justice Breyer has come closest. When analyzing a campaign finance
limitation in one pre-Citizens United case, Breyer proposed a deferential standard of review
“where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation.” Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). But the “competing
constitutionally protected interests” of which Breyer spoke are not the same as two competing
constitutional principles. Id. at 402 (emphasis added). Indeed, the cases he cited concerned
nonconstitutional governmental interests sufficiently important to justify the regulation of
speech, see id. at 402-03 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-88 (1988)), such as Frisby
v. Schultz, which held that a person’s “well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home” is a
“significant government interest,” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980)), and circumstances in which two parties had competing speech interests, see
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (citing numerous such cases). Two recent books, which focus primarily
on human rights law and the European Court of Human Rights, address the related issue of
how conflicting rights should be adjudicated. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER KINGS?
THE ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL VALUES (2011); LORENZO
ZUCCA, CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: CONFLICTS OF FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE
AND THE USA (2007). Though BCRA concerns the different issue of a conflict between a
constitutional right and a structural constitutional principle, many of Professor Christie’s
ideas are nevertheless applicable. I hope in a future work to provide a comprehensive
treatment of the issue of conflicts among constitutional principles.
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There are two reasons such deference would have been appropri-
ate. First, there is no objective way to reconcile competing incom-
mensurable constitutional commitments.368 Greater weight must
be given to one, and deciding the extent to which one prevails over
the other is an unavoidably subjective judgment.369 The political
branches are better suited than courts to harmonizing incommen-
surable constitutional commitments on basic democratic grounds
due to harmonization’s inescapable subjectivity.370 In fact, the same
reasons that democracies place primary responsibility in legisla-
tures to harmonize incommensurable nonconstitutional public poli-
cies suggest that legislatures also should be primarily responsible
for reconciling competing constitutional commitments. 
Second, legislatures frequently have greater institutional exper-
tise than courts in ferreting out and understanding the empirical
judgments that are relevant to reconciling competing constitutional
principles. This unquestionably is the case with election regulation.
Justice Breyer is right that “the legislature understands the
problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democrati-
zation—better than [courts] do” and that the Court accordingly
should “defer to [Congress’s] political judgment that unlimited
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”371 So was
Justice White’s dissent in Buckley, where he observed that 
Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also
have corruptive potential; but the Court strikes down the
provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to what
may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by ....
many seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in
368. That is to say, the two principles cannot be reduced to a common metric that would
then allow for an objectively correct decision to harmonize the conflict by choosing the
principle with the highest value. See generally CHRISTIE, supra note 367, at 167-68 (providing
a clear discussion of the incommensurability of constitutional values). In theory, the
statement above is not true for an originalist if originalist sources considered and definitively
resolved the conflict. In practice, originalist sources seldom if ever do so. 
369. See, e.g., id. at 167 (concluding that when human rights conflict, judges “are in fact
choosing between values”). 
370. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:
Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the
Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 967-69 (2006). 
371. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over
many years.372
For these reasons, courts should give significant deference to the
political branches’ considered judgments as to how competing
constitutional commitments should be harmonized. The judicial role
should be to “ask[ ] whether the statute burdens any one such
interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute’s salutary
effects upon the others.”373 Congress’s judgment should be judicially
overridden only when there may be failures in the political process
that undermine faith in the political branches’ decisions.374 The
usual circumstances that lead to judicial suspicion of the political
processes—such as the presence of discrete and insular minor-
ities375—are absent from the instant context of campaign finance.
The one concern is whether the congressional judgment was a form
of self-dealing that harmed unrepresented outsiders376—people not
currently in the legislature who might want to run for election in
the future. The most important question for determining the appro-
priate level of judicial deference is whether a campaign finance
enactment had the intention, or effect, of protecting incumbents by
making campaigning more difficult for challengers.377 Challengers,
after all, are generally less known to the public than incumbents,
and challengers accordingly might be more harmed than incum-
bents by fundraising restrictions.378
If Congress enacted BCRA for the purpose of protecting itself,
such a judgment clearly would not be deserving of judicial deference.
372. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 260-61 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
373. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see supra note 367 (discussing the
limitations of Breyer’s approach in Nixon).
374. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402-03; cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-180 (1980) (arguing that the judiciary’s interference with ordinary
majoritarian politics is appropriate when there are failures in the democratic process).
375. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
376. See ELY, supra note 374, at 83-86.
377. Cf. Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230, 248-49 (2006); supra notes 184-87 and
accompanying text.
378. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072-73 (1996) (arguing that “[c]ontribution
limits tend to favor incumbents by making it harder for challengers to raise money and
thereby make credible runs for office”).
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A difficult question would be presented if, even absent any in-
cumbent-protection intent on the part of Congress, campaign
finance regulations had the effect of protecting incumbents.
Establishing that campaign finance has such an effect, however,
ought to require serious empirical analysis, not just armchair
theorizing.379 But even if campaign finance could be shown to have
some incumbency-protecting effects, thereby diminishing or elim-
inating judicial deference to the legislature’s judgment, such effects
should not ipso facto lead to a court’s conclusion that the legislation
is unconstitutional. Campaign finance regulations conceivably could
have sufficiently important countervailing benefits vis-à-vis other
aspects of Republican Legitimacy. 
Determining what, if any, connection there is between campaign
finance and incumbency protection lies beyond the scope of this
Article. What is relevant is that the constitutional principle of
Republican Legitimacy identifies a crucial issue that was almost
entirely absent from the Court’s analysis in Citizens United;380
determining whether campaign finance regulations are a form of
incumbent protection is necessary to determining the judicial
deference that should be given to the political branches’ considered
harmonization of the competing constitutional commitments of free
speech and Republican Legitimacy.
IV. CONCLUSION (AND PROLOGUE)
First, a brief conclusion. Partisan gerrymandering and burden-
some identification requirements that discourage certain popula-
tions from voting harm individuals, but they also threaten struc-
tural constitutional harms to representative democracy. To date,
case law has recognized only the former type of harm: individual
379. The strongest argument that campaign finance regulations protect incumbents was
short on empirics. See id. at 1072-75. 
380. In some of the cases prior to Citizens United, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had
explicitly accused campaign finance of being an incumbency protection ploy. See, e.g.,
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 247-50 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The more
liberal members of the Court have offered up arguments in opposition. See, e.g., Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 968-70 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the majority
opinion in Citizens United did not explicitly invoke the incumbency protection accusation,
Justice Stevens’s dissent did. See id.
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rights-based claims grounded in equal protection and free speech.
This Article identifies the structural constitutional interest that also
is endangered—Republican Legitimacy—and explains why it is
important that Republican Legitimacy be recognized as a stand-
alone, structural constitutional principle. 
Now to the prologue.381 While courts have a vital role in imple-
menting Republican Legitimacy—courts should identify Republican
Legitimacy as a constitutional principle, define it, and determine
what role they and other governmental institutions properly play in
securing Republican Legitimacy—they are incapable of fully en-
forcing it on their own. Inherently political considerations appropri-
ately inform many of the rules of the road of representative
democracy. Legislatures have better access to the information that
properly informs—and are better institutionally constituted to
making the hard tradeoffs among the competing legitimate commit-
ments that invariably lie behind—most of representative democ-
racy’s rules of the road. Further, courts are a poor institutional
context for distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable
compromises among legitimate considerations, though they can play
an important backup role in policing, and hopefully thereby de-
terring, egregious violations.382
This means that the political branches themselves must be
primarily responsible for protecting Republican Legitimacy. This
can be done if legislatures choose representative democracy’s rules
of the road by means of “tempered” rather than run-of-the-mill
“hardball” politics. Tempered politics refers to a set of norms that
aim to harness politicians’ compromise-seeking and deal-making
skills, while ensuring that the legislative outcomes constitute rea-
sonable compromises that do not undermine Republican Legitimacy.
Tempered politics mitigates the ordinary rough-and-tumble of
politics in two respects: decisions implicating Republican Legitimacy
must be (1) bipartisan, rather than deeply partisan, and (2) com-
monwealth directed, rather than self-interested or party-interested.
In short, tempered politics is the higher-order care we expect when
politicians consider constitutional amendments. And this is sensible
381. A companion article addresses the issues that follow. See Rosen, supra note 17.
382. See supra notes 368-74 and accompanying text.
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insofar as the rules of the road of representative democracy impli-
cate constitutional matters. 
But one may wonder how realistic it is to expect that legislators
will self-regulate and act in accordance with the norms of tempered
politics. They are the ones, after all, who have harmed Republican
Legitimacy in the first place. Fortunately, there are two reasons
why reliance on legislatures is not a “self-defeating proposal” that
unrealistically asks the legislatures to overcome the very weak-
nesses that my proposal aims to remedy.383 First, there is no reason
to presume that legislators will not take seriously their oaths to
uphold the Constitution once they understand that it contains
the principle of Republican Legitimacy. Second, most harms to
Republican Legitimacy have been created by state legislatures—the
institutions that are presumptively, and primarily, responsible
under the Constitution for establishing the rules governing both
state and federal elections.384 Congress faces different incentives
that insulate it from many of the pressures to which state legisla-
tures are subject. There are several legislative strategies Congress
can use to encourage states to act consistently with tempered
politics. Their detailed elaboration, however, must await another
day. 
383. For the concept of self-defeating proposals, see Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating
Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 636-40 (2006).
384. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
